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NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY - START II

Y 4. AR 5/3: S. HRG. 104-382

National Security Implications of U...

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 17, 1995

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

MAY 17, 1995

	Page
Clark, Lt. Gen. Wesley K., USA, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff	2
Slocombe, Hon. Walter B., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy	7

NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY - START II

WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 1995

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room SR–222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Strom Thurmond (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Thurmond, Warner, Nunn, Exon, and Levin

Committee staff members present: Richard L. Reynard, staff director; George W. Lauffer, deputy staff director; Melinda M. Koutsoumpas, chief clerk; Marie Fabrizio Dickinson, deputy chief clerk.

Professional staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, Lucia M. Chavez, Jonathan L. Etherton, and Eric H. Thoemmes.

Minority staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, minority staff director; Richard E. Combs, Jr. and William E. Hoehn, Jr., professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Kathleen M. Paralusz, Connie B. Rader, Jason Rossbach, and Mickie Jan Wise.

Committee members' assistants present: Judith A. Ansley, assistant to Senator Warner; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Richard F. Schwab, assistant to Senator Coats; Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith; Glen E. Tait, assistant to Senator Kempthorne; Patricia L. Stolnacker, assistant to Senator Santorum; Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; Richard W. Fieldhouse, assistant to Senator Levin; Randy J. Rydell, assistant to Senator Glenn; C. Richard D'Amato, assistant to Senator Byrd; William Owens, Senator to Senator Robb; John F. Lilley, assistant to Senator Lieberman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND, CHAIRMAN

Chairman THURMOND. The meeting will come to order. The committee meets this morning to receive testimony on the military implication of ratification of the follow-on treaty to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, known as START II.

This morning we have witnesses from the administration, Walter Slocombe, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Lt. Gen.

Wesley Clark, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The START II Treaty, signed by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin in January, 1993, represents a dramatic change in the relationship between Moscow and the United States.

If ratified and implemented by both nations, START II will represent a continuation of the unprecedented reduction of strategic arsenals of both the United States and Russia.

As I stated back in 1992, when the committee considered the military implications of the ratification of START I, I believe that stabilizing reductions in nuclear weapons is in the Nation's and humanity's best interest.

At the same time, it is the committee's obligation to review the military implications of this treaty, and to make a judgment on whether the ratification and implementation of this treaty is in the national security interest of the United States.

For example, even though President Yeltsin recently reaffirmed Russia's commitment to ratify and implement START II, I am concerned about the practicality of the Russian Government to make that happen, given the current political, military, and economic situation in Russia.

With that in mind, I am concerned with the post-START II force structure recommended in the September 1993 nuclear posture review, and any effort of the administration to implement START II reductions prior to Russian ratification and implementation of START II.

Additionally, I am concerned about efforts by the Russian legislature to amend START II in any way that would allow them to keep their MIRV ICBMs—the SS18s.

I am concerned with the ability of the United States, as it draws down its own strategic nuclear forces, to verify and monitor the reciprocal obligations of Russia with full confidence.

The United States will continue to require and depend upon its strategic forces for the foreseeable future to deter a broad range of threats. In order to do this, we will have to move away from an offense-only policy of deterrence, and it will be necessary to work cooperatively with Russia.

We must move beyond the mind-set of the ABM treaty, that equates vulnerability with stability. If we are to continue reductions in strategic nuclear forces, we must integrate defense into our deterrence policy and break the linkage between such reductions and the ABM treaty once again, as we undertake our responsibility to review the military implication of START II, and fulfill our role under Article Two, Section Two of the Constitution, to provide advice and consent to ratification of international treaties.

I want to welcome our witnesses to the Senate Armed Services Committee this morning. Since Mr. Slocombe has not shown up, I will ask General Clark to proceed with his statement. When Mr. Slocombe comes in, he can follow General Clark.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WESLEY K. CLARK, USA, DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General CLARK. I am very pleased to be here and have the chance to present my own views, and my views on behalf of the

chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the START II Treaty.

I would begin by noting that since the late 1950s we and the former Soviet Union have engaged in a series of protracted and labored arms control negotiations, always with the goal of trying to find a way to make our nation safer from the threat of nuclear destruction.

For decades we pursued this course, first avoiding a new incentive to an even more frantic arms race, and we obtained an agreement to work our systems, and then later we signed treaties that limited the growth of our nuclear forces.

These treaties primarily arrested the expansion of our arsenals, but it was always our hope that we would change our focus from simply slowing the nuclear arms race to actually reversing the arms race.

The START I Treaty that entered into force last December the result of 10 years of difficult and exhaustive negotiations, was such an accomplishment. For the first time, we actually agreed to reduce our arsenals.

But the end of the Cold War opened the opportunity for even more profound reductions. This was the spirit that permeated the START II negotiations.

Let me state clearly that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted every step of the way, and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are accommodated in this treaty.

START II builds on the progress of START I, but goes beyond it, because it will restructure the nuclear forces to eliminate instabilities that have always been matters of great concern to military planners and to our citizens.

By this, I am referring to the elimination of all land-based missiles with Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles, or MIRVs, as well as all land-based heavy ICBMs.

As General Shalikashvili stated earlier in his testimony, we have always been convinced that these particular systems are intrinsically the most dangerous and destabilizing elements of our strategic arsenals.

Because they are vulnerable to a first strike from the other side, and because their multiple warheads provide a lucrative target, they impose a use-or-lose decision in a crisis that could be a very destabilizing factor.

Eliminating these systems makes both of our nuclear forces more crisis stable as deterrent forces.

Last September's nuclear posture review resulted in the design for a post-START II nuclear force that preserves a mix of U.S.-based and forward-deployed non-strategic nuclear systems, and a balanced triad of land-based ICBMs, bombers, and SLBMs that is survivable and achieves rough equivalents against Russia's post-START II forces.

From my extensive analysis, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that this future START II force of 3,500 deployed warheads constitutes an adequate deterrent against the only nation that foreseeably threatens our national existence, Russia.

Further, this force continues to provide and will continue to provide extended deterrence for our allies as well.

The provisions of START II have been carefully crafted to ensure that our bomber forces will retain the flexibility to operate as needed in both nuclear and conventional roles. Our B–52 and B–52H force will continue to be dual role, meeting both nuclear and worldwide conventional commitments.

Chairman THURMOND. General, I have to go over to the Senate now. We are going to have to take a recess for a few minutes.

General CLARK. Thank you, Senator.

[Recess.]

Chairman THURMOND. The meeting will come to order.

Mr. Slocombe, I see you are here now. I think we will let General Clark go ahead and finish his statement.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Of course.

Chairman THURMOND. General Clark, you may proceed.

General CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was talking a moment ago about the provisions of START II having been carefully crafted to ensure that our bomber forces have the flexibility that is required.

We note that the B–1B, even when it is reoriented to a purely conventional mission, will remain capable of being re-roled, if necessary, to a nuclear mission.

This flexibility will allow the U.S. bomber force to meet both nuclear deterrents and conventional war-fighting requirements for the foreseeable future.

Like this committee, we on the Joint Staff are particularly interested in our ability to verify the START II reductions.

The verification procedures that will be used for START II build upon the same interlocking and mutually reinforcing methods and procedures that have been developed using START I, but with an even greater degree of intrusiveness.

Again, the Joint Chiefs are confident that these levels of verification are sufficient to alert us to significant violations, and that adequate hedges will exist to respond, should the Russians not comply with the treaty.

When both the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces are reduced to the levels established by this treaty, both our nations will be left at levels of rough nuclear equivalent, but without the potential of crisis instability that has troubled us for decades.

This, even beyond the considerable reductions to our nuclear forces, is the beneficial hallmark of this treaty, a security gain that is as positive for the Russians as it is for the Americans.

The Chairman and the other Joint Chiefs of Staff have no reservations towards this treaty, about the strategic force reductions it entails, or about our ability to properly verify that the Russians are complying with its provisions.

I encourage the Senate to promptly give its advice and consent to the ratification of the START II Treaty.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you, General.

[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General Clark follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LT. GEN. WESLEY K. CLARK, DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, JOINT STAFF

Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Chairman in support of the START II Treaty.

Let me start by saying that, on the basis of detailed study of our security needs and careful review of the treaty, it is my judgment, and the unanimous opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the START II Treaty is in the best interests of the United States. General Shalikashvili was involved in the negotiations as Assistant to the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell; and I can clearly state that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were consulted every step of the way during the negotiations, and their views were accommodated in the treaty. Therefore, we are satisfied with the treaty. The Chairman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend ratification of the START II Treaty.

START II'S RELATIONSHIP TO START I

START II was crafted using START I as its foundation, which allowed us to use the 10 years of START I negotiations as a springboard to achieving a START II Treaty in a matter of months. Further, this allowed START II to be a short, concise treaty document. START I provides the basic rules, definitions, verification, implementation, and conversion/elimination procedures. These procedures remain in effect and must be met in parallel with those of START II. There are important differences, most importantly that START I has become a multilateral treaty between the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine while START II is strictly bilateral between the United States and Russia.

Despite this complex arrangement, there are no contradictions between START I and START II. Both treaties will be in force simultaneously, and there are no requirements in one that would cause a party to violate the other.

MILITARY SUFFICIENCY UNDER START II

During our analysis of START II, we asked three questions: Can we maintain deterrence? Will our forces be militarily sufficient? Are we increasing crisis stability? The answer to each of those questions is yes.

Nuclear deterrence has been the fundamental underpinning of our strategy for the past four decades. Last September, we completed the Nuclear Posture Review, a study to determine what role nuclear forces should play in meeting future challenges to our national security. The key conclusion of this review is that, even in the post-Cold War world, the United States continues to require a nuclear deterrent.

The NPR stated that our deterrence stems from our capability to do two things: hold at risk those assets which a potential enemy would most value; and ensure that no enemy with access to nuclear weapons could achieve his war aims against us or our allies, no matter how he might design an attack. In practice, this means an appropriate targeting strategy, a suitable range of response options, an adequate number of survivable forces, and survivable, sustained command and control of these forces. A credible deterrent force is built on these pillars, and defines what is necessary to support our alliance commitments, hedge against changes, provide stability in a crisis, and support arms control.

The Chairman and Joint Chiefs and our staffs have examined the capabilities of our post-START II nuclear forces. In this assessment, we analyzed several measures of effectiveness, including level of damage expected, target coverage, numbers and types of survivable weapons, and our reserve force posture. In every measure, the 3,500 warhead force which we will retain under START II, consistent with the NPR, is militarily sufficient, both in size and capability, to meet the requirements of our deterrent strategy. This force will consist of 14 Trident submarines armed with the D–5 missile system, 66 B–52 bombers, 20 B–2 bombers, and 450–500 Minuteman III missiles. This triad strikes a prudent balance between leading the way to a safer world and hedging against the unexpected.

Of the achievements of START II, the increase in crisis stability is probably the most striking. START II builds upon the accomplishments of START I by finally eliminating the most destabilizing weapons; land-based ICBMs with multiple independently targetable nuclear warheads, or MIRVs. Along with MIRVs in general, START II achieves the long-standing U.S. goal of eliminating the last of the heavy ICBMs, the SS–18. In the past, with potentially vulnerable MIRVed ICBMs on both sides, there was much greater incentive to shoot first in a crisis. As START II eliminates these destabilizing systems, we will retain sufficient numbers of single-warhead ICBMs, SLBMs, and manned bombers to maintain a viable deterrent that promotes stability.

MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY

The Joint Staff is part of the policy community that must assess the verifiability of the treaty and Russian compliance. Further, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has a special role to judge the military impact posed by the monitoring chal-

lenges which the Intelligence Community has identified and, of course, to judge the military significance of potential violations and cheating scenarios.

Turning first to verification, the START II Treaty builds upon the interlocking and mutually reinforcing verification provisions established in START I. Unless otherwise specified in the treaty, the counting rules, notifications, inspections and monitoring procedures from START I are used in START II. These treaty requirements are backed up by our own National Technical Means. These capabilities are further enhanced by changes in Russian society. It will be many years, if ever, until Russia achieves the same degree of openness as our society. But the ongoing changes in the political and economic circumstances within Russia, which lead to greater public transparency, will make deliberate violations even more difficult to hide in the future than they were during the Cold War years.

We are confident that the majority of monitoring requirements for START II can be accomplished with high confidence and there is little chance that the Russians can engage in militarily significant cheating. Further, the Joint Staff judges that the military risk to U.S. security associated with any monitoring uncertainties is low. In short, the START II Treaty is effectively verifiable.

The Russians, naturally, have the same rights to verify compliance as we do. We have paid particular care to ensure the treaty cannot be used to compromise sensitive U.S. technology or hamper the freedom of action of our forces, especially when used in a conventional role. I am confident that the treaty verification procedures are sufficiently restrictive to protect ourselves from unnecessary intrusion.

MILITARY VIEW OF CHEATING

One of the most important judgments the Chairman may be called to make is to determine what constitutes a militarily significant violation of the START II Treaty. General Shalikashvili's view, which I share, is that a militarily significant violation occurs when one side can achieve a significant increase in capability over the other side such that the increased threat warrants a change in force structure.

Therefore, the answer to the question, "Is a particular violation militarily significant?", depends on the situation. In our analysis of this question, we have tried to determine what, if any future cheating scenarios might result in violations of military significance.

Both during and after the treaty negotiations, we have examined multiple ways that the Russians could conceivably violate the treaty to augment their forces. It is difficult to come up with a militarily relevant cheating scenario.

Just as we assess that our force structure under the Nuclear Posture Review is adequate to meet our objectives, we believe that under START II the Russians will have adequate numbers of deployed warheads to achieve their military objectives. Even at fewer than 3,500 warheads, Russia will have sufficient warheads to cover their U.S. targets and still maintain a reserve. Because of this, additional warheads generated by cheating would only have marginal effect on damage expectancy or would be used to increase each sides' reserve force. Since these additional warheads would have only marginal effect on a Russian attack and would be very embarrassing if detected, we can find little incentive to carry out a military significant violation.

We also examined the potential for cheating from the aspect of what, if any, threat there could be to our Triad forces. As we evolve to our strategic force structure under START I and START II, a significant portion of our retaliatory capability, our deterrence force, will be at sea. It will be very survivable and very secure. Additional warheads would not increase the threat to our SSBNs.

In our ICBM force we will retain single warhead Minuteman III missiles. It is unlikely that the Russians will want to target several of its warheads against each of our single warhead ICBMs—trading several of their warheads for the possibility of killing one of ours is a poor bargain. Moreover, adopting a cheating scenario to generate more warheads makes little sense in terms of either greater incremental damage to our silos or accepting the risk of being detected as a cheater.

Our bombers are already off alert. Therefore they are, in their day-to-day posture, vulnerable now. Additional Russian warheads would add little. But if we detected a breakout from the treaty, we could resume bomber alert in a very short time and take other measures to reduce our vulnerability. Again, this would be a very bad bargain for the Russians.

Let me emphasize my bottom line: our military confidence in the verifiability of START II rests on the viability of our modernized deterrent forces. Given that the Triad continues to be a highly effective deterrent, and that we have enough weapons under START II to accomplish our objectives, the risk of a militarily significant level of cheating is minimal.

The JCS view is, no cheating scenario poses a threat that would be judged militarily significant by the United States, i.e., that would both go undetected and be of such an extent as to require a change in U.S. force structure. While we judge it unlikely that Russia would attempt a breakout from the START II constraints, we are confident that such a breakout would be detected in time to respond. Under the NPR force structure, the U.S. side's ability to restore its own forces to higher levels would be more than equal to the challenge.

RECOMMENDATION

To conclude, START II is a balanced and a fair treaty which offers a significant contribution to our national security. Under its provisions, we significantly increase stability and reduce the incentive for a first-strike. For decades, we and the Russians have lived with this dangerous situation. With this treaty, we can at long last put it behind us.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have carefully assessed the impact of the START II Treaty. We find that with the balanced triad of 3,500 warheads that will remain once this treaty is implemented, the size and mix of our remaining nuclear forces will support our deterrent and targeting requirements against any known adversary and under the worst assumptions. Both American and Russian strategic nuclear forces will be suspended at levels of rough equivalence; a balance with greatly reduced incentive for a first strike. By every military measure, START II is a sound agreement that will make our Nation more secure. Under its terms, our forces will remain militarily sufficient, crisis stability will be greatly improved, and we are confident in our ability to effectively verify its implementation. This treaty is clearly in the best interests of the United States.

On behalf of the Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff, I recommend the Senate give its advice and consent to the ratification of the START II Treaty.

Chairman THURMOND. Mr. Slocombe.

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY; ACCOMPANIED BY COL. MAX HARSHMAN, CHIEF, START–INF DIVISION OF THE ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I apologize for being late. We were caught in the usual reaction of Washington traffic to rain.

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and convey the Department of Defense's strong support for the START II Treaty.

In my full statement, which the committee has, I outline how the treaty fits into our overall effort to prevent the reemergence of the nuclear danger to the United States, as well as how the treaty relates to the force structure decisions that were made last year in the nuclear posture review.

The statement also addresses how START II will complement the other efforts we are making to reduce the nuclear threat, including the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

The START II Treaty represents a dramatic step in arms control. I have spent, as the Chairman knows, a fair part of my public career working on these issues, and it is a dramatic sign of the degree to which we have been able to get detailed and explicit agreements that this book is the text of the START I and START II agreements with some, but not all, of the ancillary documents.

This little pamphlet is the entire text for the ABM Treaty, the SALT I interim agreement, and all of the associated agreed statements.

We have come a long way, mostly, of course, because of fundamental political changes in the Soviet Union and the relationship between the United States and our allies, on the one hand, and

Russia and the states of the former Warsaw Pact, and the former Soviet Union, on the other.

These changes have opened a huge opportunity for strategic nuclear arms control.

At the Department of Defense, though, we are particularly conscious of the fact that these favorable developments are neither complete nor irreversible.

And we are conscious of the fact that the former Soviet Union is a potential source of nuclear material for states eager to develop their own nuclear capability, and that we have no higher defense priority than to avoid a return to the arsenals of the Cold War period, and prevent the proliferation of such weapons.

The administration has undertaken a multi-pronged approach to meet the post-Cold War nuclear challenge. First, under the Cooperative Threat Reduction, or Nunn-Lugar program, we are helping Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union to destroy their strategic offensive arms and chemical weapons, to maintain safety and security for the warheads and fissile materials that remain, and to reorient their nuclear scientists and chemical-related military facilities to peaceful enterprises.

Second, we have successfully pushed for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and we are working on other counter-proliferation efforts, as a part of our overall effort to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Third, our defense programs consciously hedge against the possibility of reversals or new threats.

This hedge strategy has three parts; first, maintaining deterrence at reduced, but still highly effective force levels following the strategy outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review; second, developing ballistic missile defenses against existing and potential threats from states other than Russia, consistent with the ABM Treaty, and maintaining a treaty-compliant R&D program for the possibility of national missile defense deployment; and third, developing non-nuclear counters to weapons of mass destruction both to deter and defeat their use in regional conflicts.

And finally, on the subject of this morning's hearing, we are continuing the process of reducing strategic arms and stabilizing their structures, as represented by the START II Treaty and other arms control initiatives.

The committee will be familiar with the technical provisions of the treaty itself. They involve unprecedented reductions in nuclear forces to codify rough strategic equivalence at much lower levels.

One of the most significant achievements of the treaty is to eliminate all land-based multiple warhead ICBMs and all heavy ICBMs. These have been long-standing U.S. arms control goals, because of the inherent instability caused by such systems.

General Clark, in his statement, has addressed the issue of verification. I would add to it in my oral statement only that the treaty builds on the comprehensive verification regime built into START I to ensure compliance.

This, as you know, involves an elaborate system of declarations, inspections, and required data exchanges, as well a non-interference with national technical means of verification.

The START II Treaty also goes beyond START I in a number of important verification respects, providing specialized procedures and requirements for some of the particular rules in the treaty.

Through these and other measures, even if reform in Russia should falter, START II would help us verify the state of Russian strategic forces, and thereby ensure against a rapid return to the force levels and structures of the Cold War.

Of course, ultimately, we will rely on our national technical intelligence capability, but we believe that this capability, coupled with the verification provisions in the treaty, would allow us to detect an illegal buildup in time to take the appropriate corrective actions.

Also appropriate in this context is to mention the prospect for Russian ratification. First, responding to what I understood you said in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman, the United States will not implement the reductions required by the START II Treaty until both countries have exchanged their instruments of ratification and the treaty enters into force.

It is a measure of how much the world has changed, that in Russia now, as well as in the United States, a democratically elected parliament, entirely independent from the executive branch, and that one may say is not entirely supportive on it on each issue, must approve this treaty.

President Yeltsin assured President Clinton last week that the Russian Government will make every effort to press the Russian parliament for early ratification.

The United States has been working actively to discuss START II and related issues with leaders of all political groups in the Russian parliament, because we understand that ratification is a decision to be made through their parliamentary processes, and not by the executive branch.

Although there is certainly some uncertainty about the prospects, we are confident that in due course the Russian people and their elected representatives will see that START II serves their interests as well as ours, both in the direct sense of making it possible to have adequate strategic forces at substantially lower levels, by reducing the dangers of misuse or diversion of nuclear materials, and by contributing to an improved overall state of relations between the United States and Russia.

It is also appropriate in this context to mention the degree of progress which has already been made on implementing START I, which, of course, is already in effect, although the deadlines have not come about yet.

Even though START I entered into force last December, the United States and the former Soviet Union have already made significant progress toward meeting the limits of that treaty.

From the United States part, we have deactivated all our forces that will eventually be eliminated under START I. This has meant we have removed over 3,900 warheads from ballistic missiles, and retired heavy bombers to elimination facilities.

We are now, on the basis of our elimination of some 300 missile launchers and 240 heavy bombers, below the first START I intermediate ceilings on delivery systems and warheads, which will not come into effect until December of 1997.

We undertook these deactivations and eliminations early, because we determined that our remaining strategic forces would be militarily sufficient, given an opposing strategic force of any probable size.

Our START I Treaty partners in the former Soviet Union are also making important strides toward meeting START I limits.

Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus have not yet deactivated all systems that will eventually have to be eliminated, but they have made good progress.

Russia, in particular, has moved rapidly on launcher eliminations, and like the United States, the former Soviet republics collectively have already met first START I intermediate ceiling on delivery systems with over 600 missile launchers and heavy bombers eliminated so far.

Indeed, they are very close to meeting the second intermediate ceiling on delivery systems, which will not take effect until December of 1999.

The implementation of START I and the NPT by the other three non-Russian former Soviet republics, which inherited nuclear weapons, continues to proceed.

One of the important accomplishments of recent years has been getting those three countries to agree to give up entirely the nuclear arsenals which they would otherwise have had on their territory.

Already over 2,700 strategic warheads in these three countries have been deactivated, and over 2,100 have been returned to Russia. An additional 1,000 strategic warheads have been deactivated in Russia itself.

The success of START I implementation thus far leaves us confident that START II's limits can be achieved on schedule.

My statement also outlines other measures we are taking to reduce the nuclear danger. These include an agreement that once the START II Treaty is ratified, both the United States and Russia would proceed to deactivate early those systems to be reduced under the treaty, as a preliminary to complying with the full reduction and elimination provisions.

The statement also outlines the important initiatives taken under the Bush Administration for non-strategic nuclear forces, which have drastically reduced the level of deployment of these forces.

However, we do believe that non-strategic nuclear forces remain an area for future work in arms control. Also, as you know, the United States and Russia have decided not to target their respective strategic forces on any country, including each other, and those procedures are now in effect.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction program is a critical part of our overall approach to reducing the nuclear threat to the United States from weapons left over in the former Soviet Union, and to providing dismantlement and demilitarization assistance to our START I partners.

That program has facilitated the deactivations which I outlined a few moments ago.

I want to underscore that the Cooperative Threat Reduction program is not about financing other countries' obligations to make reductions.

Nunn-Lugar aid has been vital to the effort to help Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine make the transition to a non-nuclear weapon status, but we believe that Russia is fully capable of meeting its commitments under both treaties on schedule and without U.S. assistance.

The purpose of the U.S. assistance, rather, is to ensure that those reductions take place in the safest and most secure manner possible, not only to prevent accidents, but to prevent potential diversion, and to accelerate those reductions, so that we enjoy the stabilizing benefits of the treaty at an early date. In addition, and very important, our assistance promotes the safety and security of the remaining nuclear weapons and fissile material and the conversion of weapons of mass destruction-related facilities in Russia to non-military purposes.

The statement outlines the way in which we have focused the Cooperative Threat Reduction program on these efforts. The program is a small investment relative to the immense investments both sides have made in nuclear forces, and it truly is defense by other means.

It also has another important non-proliferation aspect. By helping ensure the safe reduction of the old Soviet arsenal, the security of remaining nuclear weapons and materials, and the conversion of defense industries to peaceful enterprises, it helps prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and technical expertise to states eager to advance their own nuclear programs.

Dollar for dollar, there is no better way to spend national security resources than to help eliminate a former enemy's nuclear weapons and convert its nuclear and other mass destruction weapons industry to peaceful enterprises.

All that said, we are acutely conscious of the need to hedge against the possibility of new challenges and possible reversals. One element of our hedge strategy is our ballistic missile defense program.

That program is directed against the prospect of the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles by states other than Russia.

We have in the new budget and the defense program a robust program in theater missile defense (TMD), which is the immediate priority.

We also continue our treaty compliant R&D programs to be able, should the threat arise, to deploy a ground-based national missile defense against limited numbers of ballistic missiles.

In support of our objective of deploying effective TMD systems, agreement was reached at the recent Moscow summit on several basic principles that will serve as a basis for further discussion in order to reach agreement on the demarcation between ABM and theater missile defense systems.

The principles clearly acknowledged that both sides can deploy effective theater missile defenses. The principles also make clear that the treaty does not apply to theater missile defense systems that may simply have a theoretical capability against some strate-

gic missiles, but which would not be militarily significant in the context of operational considerations.

Specifically, theater missile defenses may be deployed that will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side, and that are not tested to give such capability.

We believe these principles restate the meaning of the ABM Treaty and reaffirm our ability to deploy advanced TMD to protect our forces, friends, and allies, while preserving the viability and integrity of the ABM Treaty with respect to strategic ballistic missiles.

Finally, a major component in our hedge strategy must be to maintain a robust deterrent force. We can deploy such a force under START II. General Clark has reviewed in his statement the key elements of that force.

We are confident that the forces we plan to deploy under START II will be effective for deterrence.

In particular, they will be sufficient to deter a hypothetical hostile Russian Government by holding at risk a broad range of assets valued by such a regime's political and military leaders, by maintaining a strategic reserve force to ensure continued deterrence of other nuclear powers, and by taking account of the fact that there will be systems which are not available due to maintenance and overhaul.

Further, the forces resulting from START II and the Nuclear Posture Review allow us to hedge against the return of the nuclear danger by making appropriate adjustments in our forces, should that become necessary.

Of course, Russia is continuing to modernize its own forces, though its levels of spending on strategic arms are very much lower than during the Cold War.

Such modernization, directed primarily at follow-on missiles to augment and replace the single warhead SS–25 ICBM and the SS–N–20 SLBM is consistent with START II. We will, of course, continue to monitor Russian modernization programs closely.

We will also continue to press Russia to reduce its large stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons to much lower levels more in line with realistic requirements.

Ratification and implementation of START II by both sides will help ensure that these improvements become permanent by providing a formal, predictable process for reductions.

START II thus presents us with the best of both worlds: Reductions which improve stability, but the ability still to meet our requirements and to adjust, should the world change.

On behalf of the Department of Defense, I wholeheartedly urge the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of this treaty by the United States. I look forward to the opportunity to address your questions.

Thank you.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Slocombe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear today and express the Defense Department's strong support for the START II Treaty. I will describe in the

next few minutes how START II fits into our overall effort to prevent the reemergence of a nuclear danger to the United States, as well as how the treaty relates to the force structure decisions we made last year in the Nuclear Posture Review. I will also address how START II will build upon the significant accomplishments we have made in reducing the nuclear threat under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were bitter enemies engaged in a dangerous arms race. Our two countries developed and deployed massive arsenals of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons with which to deter each other. Even the treaties designed to control that arms race were the result of years of negotiations between suspicious adversaries.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the world has begun to move away from that dangerous state of affairs. The nuclear threat to the United States is now greatly reduced and of a different form. Cooperative efforts to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union have contributed significantly to U.S. security.

These developments, however, are neither complete nor irreversible. Russia's transformation to a stable democracy and a market economy is still in its early stages. The Russia arsenal remains the only force capable of threatening U.S. national survival. Furthermore, the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction now poses a growing threat to U.S. and global security. The former Soviet Union is a potential source of nuclear material for states eager to develop their own nuclear capability. We must avoid a return to the large arsenals of the Cold War and prevent proliferation of such weapons.

The administration has undertaken a multi-pronged approach to meet the post-Cold War nuclear challenge.

- First, under the Cooperative Threat Reduction, or "Nunn-Lugar" program, we are helping Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union to destroy their strategic offensive arms and chemical weapons and to reorient their nuclear scientists and facilities to peaceful enterprises.
- Second, we successfully pushed for the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and are working on other counter proliferation efforts, as part of our overall effort to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
- Third, while we have already experienced much success, in our defense programs we are hedging against possible reversals and new threats. This hedge strategy has three parts: maintaining deterrence at reduced force levels, following the strategy outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review; developing ballistic missile defenses against existing and potential threats from states other than Russia, consistent with the ABM Treaty; and developing non-nuclear counters to the threat of weapons of mass destruction in regional conflicts, through the Counterproliferation Initiative.
- Finally, we are continuing the process of reducing strategic arms and stabilizing their structures, as represented by START II.

START II PROVISIONS

START II makes unprecedented reductions in nuclear forces and codifies rough strategic equivalence at much lower levels. The treaty will reduce the overall level of deployed strategic warheads by about two thirds from pre-START I levels, the most sweeping nuclear arms reductions in history. By January 1, 2003, the United States and Russia may deploy no more than 3,500 warheads in their strategic forces. A maximum of 1,750 of these warheads may be deployed on SLBMs. In addition, by 2003 no warheads may be deployed on multiple-warhead or heavy ICBMs.

It is the last of these provisions that is most significant for the United States. START II achieves a long-standing U.S. arms control goal by eliminating all multiple-warhead and heavy ICBMs, the most threatening of the Cold War nuclear delivery systems. It thus ensures that the drawdown of nuclear forces will occur in a favorable direction—away from large, vulnerable, first-strike missiles such as the Russia SS–18, and toward weapons that serve as more stabilizing deterrents. Russia's START II ICBM force structure is likely to be built around single warhead ICBMs—the existing SS–25 and the follow-on missile currently in flight-testing. Such a force will enhance stability by eliminating the pressure to use MIRVed ICBMs quickly in a crisis.

START II uses the comprehensive verification regime built into START I to ensure compliance, but it goes beyond START I in a number of important respects. START II requires physical elimination of SS–18 heavy ICBMs themselves, and gives the United States rights to inspect such elimination. The treaty allows de-

tailed on-site inspection to confirm the conversion of up to 90 SS–18 silos that Russia may use for SS–25-type single warhead missiles. It allows four additional reentry vehicle inspections each year to confirm that the missiles in these silos have no more than one warhead. Through these and other measures, even if reform in Russia should falter, START II would help ensure against a rapid return to the force levels and structures of the Cold War. Further, our verification rights, coupled with our national intelligence capabilities, should allow us to detect such a buildup in time to take corrective actions.

We estimate that the total cost of U.S. compliance and verification under START II will amount to approximately $200 million between now and 2003. This is primarily for carrying out the necessary reductions and for conducting inspections. START II gives us increased stability and confidence at a relatively small cost, thanks to its use of the START I framework. Our commitment to the arms control process begun under START I has thus been doubly beneficial: not only has START I survived the breakup of the Soviet Union and the transition to a multi-party treaty, but its structure provided the foundation for our agreement with Russia on START II.

It is a measure of how much the world has changed that in Russia as well as in the United States a democratically elected parliament, entirely independent from the executive branch, must approve this treaty. Although there is some uncertainty about the prospects, President Yeltsin assured President Clinton last week that the Russia Government will make every effort to press the parliament for early ratification. The United States Government has been working actively to discuss START II with leaders of all political groups in the Russia parliament.

We are confident that the Russia people and their elected representatives will see that START II reflects a new cooperative relationship between our two countries that allows each to avoid the future burden of excessively large strategic arsenals, while preserving each country's security interests. Without START II, Russia would need to invest significant resources to maintain its strategic nuclear forces at or near START I levels. By permitting both sides to reduce their forces in tandem, the treaty allows Russia—like the United States—to shift scarce resources toward more productive sectors of its economy. In addition, by eliminating both sides' most threatening systems, the treaty will improve not only strategic stability but also the political relationship between the United States and Russia. The degree of openness about each side's strategic forces implicit in START II will likewise reinforce the improvements in the post-Cold War security environment.

PROGRESS TOWARD REDUCTIONS

The new cooperative nature of arms reduction is evidenced by the fact that, even though START I only entered into force last December, the United States and the former Soviet Union have already made significant progress toward meeting the limits of that treaty. United States implementation of START I continues to proceed smoothly. We have deactivated all of our forces to be eliminated under START I, by removing over 3,900 warheads from ballistic missiles and retiring heavy bombers to elimination facilities. We have already eliminated over 300 missile launchers and over 240 heavy bombers, putting us below the first START I intermediate ceiling that will not come into effect until December 1997. The United States undertook these deactivations and eliminations early because we determined that our remaining strategic forces would be militarily sufficient, given an opposing strategic force of any probable size.

Our START I Treaty partners in the former Soviet Union are also making great strides. While not all systems to be eliminated under START I in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus have been deactivated, Russia has moved rapidly on launcher eliminations. Like the United States, the former Soviet Union has already met the first intermediate ceiling on launchers, with over 600 missile launchers and heavy bombers eliminated thus far; in fact, it is very close to meeting the second intermediate limit on launchers that will not take effect until December 1999. The implementation of START I and NPT obligations by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine continues to proceed, as over 2,700 strategic warheads in these three countries have been deactivated, and over 2,100 have been returned to Russia. Over 1,000 additional strategic warheads have been deactivated in Russia itself. The success of START I implementation thus far leaves us confident that START II's limits can be achieved on schedule.

OTHER U.S.-RUSSIAN MEASURES TO REDUCE NUCLEAR DANGER

We will continue the cooperative process under START II. At their September 1994 Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that, once START II is ratified,

both sides would proceed to deactivate those systems to be reduced under the treaty. We are reviewing, and plan to discuss with the Russians, approaches to ensure that this process will be transparent and synchronized. Through such early deactivation, both sides will be able to reap the stabilizing benefits of START II well before the formal reduction period ends on January 1, 2003.

We have, furthermore, gone beyond formal agreements in this regard. In September 1991 and January 1992, the United States undertook unilateral initiatives that radically reduced our deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons, leading to the dismantlement of thousands of these warheads. While Russia also took steps to reduce and eliminate non-strategic nuclear weapons in response, it continues to retain thousands of these warheads in its stockpile. We have urged Russia to make further reductions in these systems.

In addition, the United States and Russia have decided not to target their respective strategic forces on any country. As of May 30, 1994, we no longer operate these forces day to day in a manner that presumes we are enemies.

We are also pursuing other arrangements to improve the safety and security of fissile material in Russia from production through long term disposition. Acting on summit commitments made by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, the United States and Russia have agreed to cease production of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons, work toward a broad framework of measures to make nuclear weapons dismantlement transparent and irreversible, and to develop agreed measures for the long-term disposition of plutonium.

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

The Cooperative Threat Reduction, or "Nunn-Lugar," program continues to play a major role in reducing the threat to the United States from weapons left in the former Soviet Union, providing dismantlement and demilitarization assistance to our START I partners. The program has facilitated the deactivation of over 2,700 strategic warheads in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine and over 1,000 additional strategic warheads in Russia. Roughly 700 such warheads have been returned to Russia from Ukraine, and over 1,400 have been returned from Kazakhstan. In addition, the program has helped to eliminate over 600 missile launchers and bombers.

However, I want to underscore that the Cooperative Threat Reduction program is not about financing other countries' reductions in their nuclear arsenals. While Nunn-Lugar aid has been vital to the effort to help Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine make the transition to non-nuclear status, we believe that Russia is capable of fulfilling its commitments under START I and START II on schedule and without U.S. assistance. The purpose of U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance, rather, is to help ensure that reductions take place in a safe and secure manner, and to accelerate those reductions so that we may enjoy the stabilizing benefits of these treaties at an earlier date.

In early April, Secretary Perry visited the Engels Air Force Base in Russia where former Soviet bombers are being dismantled under the START I Treaty. As one journalist wrote, "Immense bombers lay in pieces as if ripped apart by angry gods. A fuselage here, a heap of wings there, and a pile of propellers from a heavy bomber known as Bears. But this was not the work of angry gods, but the work of Russian workers using in part America equipment provided through the Nunn Lugar program—special shears, crushers, and a wonderful device called a guillotine was used to chop the wings off the bombers." This equipment was provided under the CTR Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) implementing agreement with Russia.

The Department of Defense has similar SOAE agreements with Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and continues discussions in this area with Belarus. To date, CTR assistance in the destruction and dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction in these countries totals over $500 million. Additional assistance in the chain of custody area, ensuring the safe, secure transport and storage of weapons in connection with their dismantlement, totals over $315 million. Together, these two key areas reflect over 70 percent of all CTR assistance since fiscal year 1992.

Moreover, for fiscal year 1996, the Department of Defense has sharpened the focus of the CTR program to ensure that the high priority of these elements of the program is maintained. Funding responsibilities for several CTR projects such as the International Science and Technology Centers and the Export Control and Material Control and Accountability projects, which were developed, funded and carried forward under CTR from previous years, will be assumed in fiscal year 1996 by the Government agencies which execute these projects—the Departments of State, Commerce, and Energy. This shift will help to ensure that the CTR program maintains its core defense related focus.

The Cooperative Threat Reduction program is a small investment with a big payoff for U.S. security—it truly is "defense by other means." The program has another important non-proliferation aspect: by helping to ensure the safe reduction of the old Soviet arsenal, and the conversion of nuclear weapons industries to peaceful enterprises, it helps prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and technical expertise to states eager to advance their own nuclear programs. Dollar for dollar, there is no better way to spend national security resources than to help eliminate a former enemy's nuclear weapons and convert its industry to peaceful enterprises.

HEDGING AGAINST NEW PROBLEMS

Despite these successes, however, we must hedge against the possibility of reversals. One part of our hedge strategy, directed against the prospect of the acquisition of other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles by states other than Russia, is ballistic missile defense. We have, in the new budget, a robust program in theater missile defense. In addition, we are attempting to clarify the ABM Treaty, in order that both we and the Russians can develop and deploy effective theater missile defenses while maintaining the integrity of this important, stabilizing agreement. We will also continue our R&D programs to be able, should the threat arise, to deploy a treaty-compliant ground-based national missile defense against limited numbers of strategic ballistic missiles.

In support of our objective of deploying effective TMD systems, we agreed at the recent Moscow summit on several basic principles that will serve as a basis for further discussions in order to reach agreement on the demarcation between ABM and TMD systems. The principles clearly say that both sides can deploy effective theater missile defenses. The principles also make clear that the treaty does not apply to TMD systems that may simply have a theoretical capability against some strategic missiles but which would not be militarily significant in the context of operational considerations. The statement specifies that theater missile defenses may be deployed that will not pose a realistic threat to the strategic nuclear force of the other side and are not tested to give such systems that capability. We believe these principles restate the meaning of the ABM Treaty and reaffirm our ability to deploy advanced TMD to protect our forces, friends, and allies while preserving the viability and integrity of the treaty.

A major element of our hedge strategy must be to maintain a robust deterrent force. Nuclear weapons are playing a smaller role in U.S. security than at any other time in the nuclear age. START II reflects that reality. Nevertheless, the United States must maintain a nuclear force of sufficient size and capability to hold at risk a broad range of assets valued by potentially hostile political and military leaders.

We can deploy such forces under START II. The Joint Chiefs were represented in all phases of the negotiations to ensure that the treaty's reductions are consistent with U.S. military requirements. START II has allowed us to design a right-sized nuclear force based on our own strategic requirements and that reflects the sweeping changes in the new security environment. Ratification and implementation of START II by both sides will help ensure that these improvements become permanent by providing a formal, predictable process for reductions. Indeed, the Nuclear Posture Review took as its premise the successful implementation of START II, not just by the United States, but also by Russia. We will not implement these reductions on a unilateral basis.

The force structure we will deploy under START II constitutes a stable, flexible triad. We plan to deploy 14 Trident SSBNs equipped with D–5 SLBMs, stabilizing delivery systems because of their inherent survivability. The ICBM force will consist of 450–500 Minuteman IIIs each carrying a single warhead. We also will deploy a heavy bomber force of 66 B–52s armed with long-range nuclear cruise missiles, as well as 20 B–2s in a nuclear role. We will benefit from START II's provisions by reorienting our B–Is to conventional roles. These will not count against the START II warhead limit, and can be returned to nuclear roles on a one time basis, should this become necessary.

The force I have just described will be a modern force capable of maintaining deterrence against reduced Russian forces under START II, as well as against any other power. Russia is continuing to modernize its forces, though its levels of spending on strategic offensive arms are considerably below Cold War levels. Such modernization, directed primarily at follow-on missiles to augment and replace the single-warhead SS–25 ICBM and the SS–N–20 SLBM, is not inconsistent with START II. We will, of course, continue to monitor Russian modernization programs closely. We will also continue to press Russia to reduce its large stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons to much lower levels more in line with realistic requirements. We

are confident, however, that the forces we plan to deploy under START II will be effective for deterrence.

I would add that while the forces resulting from START II and the Nuclear Posture Review allow us to hedge against the return of the nuclear danger, they also allow the flexibility for further reductions should the security environment continue to improve. START II thus presents us with the best of both worlds: reductions which improve stability, but still meet our requirements and preserve our ability to adjust should the world change.

In sum, START II will both advance our national security interests and improve strategic stability. The treaty will effectively reduce the nuclear danger, by reducing overall levels of strategic nuclear weapons and by eliminating the most destabilizing systems. It will reinforce our efforts at cooperative threat reduction. Lastly, the treaty will allow us to maintain deterrence by building a right-sized force structure that hedges against unforeseen reversals in the international security environment.

I wholeheartedly urge the Senate to give its advice and consent in support of the treaty.

Chairman THURMOND. General Clark, the original 1982 strategic arms reduction goals, as stated by General Powell in 1991, were to enhance deterrence and achieve stability through significant reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear systems, ballistic missiles, in particular, ICBMs with multiple warheads, to maintain an overall level of strategic nuclear capability that would be seen as sufficient to deter conflict, to underwrite U.S. national security, and to meet U.S. commitments to allies and friends.

General, is it your judgment that the United States strategic nuclear forces will be militarily sufficient and capable of meeting these goals in a post-START II world?

General CLARK. It is, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Secretary Slocombe, I am concerned about the viability of the U.S. nuclear triad in post-START II. The United States maintains a triad of strategic offensive nuclear forces—a mix of deploying warheads on land-, air-, and sea-based strategic nuclear delivery systems. This triad is supposed to be a hedge against technological breakthroughs that could render one or another leg of the triad vulnerable, or against a possible system-wide flaw in one leg that could render it ineffective.

Could you explain, Mr. Secretary, how START II and the Nuclear Posture Review will allow the United States to preserve the triad and its viability?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes, sir. The Nuclear Posture Review reached the conclusion that it was important to retain a triad for essentially the reasons outlined in your question. The START II agreement is fully consistent with doing so.

The force structure that we will deploy under START II constitutes a stable flexible triad, which retains the inherent advantages of each of the three parts of the force.

Specifically, we plan to deploy 14 Trident SSBNs, equipped with D–5 missiles. We will have an ICBM force that will consist of 450 or 500 Minutemen IIIs, each carrying a single warhead.

And I should say that the treaty explicitly provides for the downloading of those two missiles in order to reach the appropriate levels.

We will also deploy a heavy bomber force, with 66 B–52s armed with long-range nuclear cruise missiles and 20 B–2s in a nuclear role. As General Clark's statement outlines, we will benefit in this respect from START II's provisions by reorienting our B–1s to a conventional role.

Under the rules established in the treaty, those B–1s will not count against the START II warhead limit, and they could be returned to a nuclear role on a one-time basis, should this become necessary.

I would also add that we have in the budget and the program the necessary resources to maintain this flexible and effective triad. So the administration is committed to maintaining a triad, the resources are there to do it, and the START II agreement allows it to be done in an effective and efficient way.

Chairman THURMOND. General Clark, as START II was negotiated, the United States planned to deploy 18 Trident nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, each carrying 24 D–5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Under START II, the reentry vehicle platform, or the D–5, will carry four RVs instead of eight, which is allowed under START. I am concerned about recent representations made by the Department of Defense and military service representatives that the United States can only maintain a 14-Trident submarine force.

What signal does this send to the Russian Government, and what impact does this have on future negotiations to strategic arms reductions?

General CLARK. Mr. Chairman, we looked at the Nuclear Posture Review, at what our requirements were to achieve a sufficient and viable military deterrent under the limitations of START II, and we confirmed in that study that we needed 3,500 warheads.

We then looked at the defense economics that were involved, the capabilities of the various platforms and systems, their modernization, what the potential was for achieving the best balance across the triad, with the most survivable, most effective, and other various systems, and we determined that the best balance could be obtained of all these differing factors by going to 14 Trident boats equipped with D–5s.

That is the reason that the force structure was designed the way it is.

To my understanding, I am not sure that selecting the force structure sends any signal one way or the other to the Russians with regard to either START II or future arms control talks to have selected that force structure.

Chairman THURMOND. General, do the fiscal year 1996 and future year budgets include sufficient funds to ensure SSBN post-structure and D–5 SLBM procurement for 18 Trident subs?

General CLARK. Mr. Chairman, the funds for the procurement for the 18 Trident subs will not be there, because our plan is to go down to the level of 14. So we have eight Trident C–4 boats.

Four of those will come out of service, and then we will be left with the ten new Trident boats, and four to be converted from C–4 to D–5.

Chairman THURMOND. My time is up. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The United States and Russia have begun the baseline inspections under START, and I am wondering how they have gone so far, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The short answer is they have gone well. With a complex arrangement like this, there are always glitches of one

kind or another, but I think on the whole, we are very satisfied with how the baseline inspection procedures are going along.

I have with me people from the On-Site Inspection Agency, and if they want to add a more detailed answer to that, I will be glad to defer to them.

Senator LEVIN. Well, if there is anything different from that, perhaps they could—do they have any different conclusion than what you just gave us?

Colonel HARSHMAN. No, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Could they identify themselves, or could you identify them?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Sure.

Colonel HARSHMAN. Yes. I am Colonel Max Harshman. I am the Chief of the START–INF Division at the On-Site Inspection Agency.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Colonel. And do you agree with the Secretary's assessment?

Colonel HARSHMAN. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator LEVIN. Will the data exchange verification and inspection regimes of START I and START II provide the United States with the best ability of any strategic arms control treaty to have confidence that Russia is complying with its obligations?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes, coupled with our national technical means of verification.

Senator LEVIN. Now, at the recent summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin pledged to exchange reciprocal data on overall stockpiled warheads, fissile materials, and their safety and security measures.

Will such an exchange of data, especially coupled with the extensive inspections, displays, monitoring, and other verification provisions of START I and START II help us establish confidence in the irreversibility of Russian nuclear dismantlement?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It will. And it will also contribute to our confidence, both in this country and in Russia, as to the safety and security of the Russian, and I suppose, in principle, also the American stockpiles, that will be retained under the agreement.

Senator LEVIN. Where are the Russians in terms of—where are they in the process? Where are they in the process of START I implementation, in terms of launcher eliminations? And how does that compare with U.S. launcher elimination progress?

General CLARK. Senator, if I could provide some data here.

Senator LEVIN. Please, General.

General CLARK. Basically, the former Soviet Union countries are making excellent progress in launcher elimination. Over 600 ICBMs and bombers have been eliminated.

They have met their December 1997 intermediate ceiling on launchers, and they are approaching the December 1999 ceiling. Over 2,100 warheads have been removed from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, also, I might add.

Senator LEVIN. Now, in terms of launchers that are eliminated, that is what the START treaty requires. They are actually ahead of us, are they not? We are both in compliance, but they are actually ahead of us in terms of numbers, when we talk launchers.

General CLARK. This is correct.

Senator LEVIN. Do we also exchange data with the Russians on elimination activities, including a schedule of planned activities?

General CLARK. We do exchange that data. Yes, we do, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. Do you see anything to indicate that Russia does not plan to meet its obligations under START I?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No. Far from it. They are, as your question implies, well ahead of the minimum schedule that would be necessary to meet those requirements.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, your prepared testimony states that the forces that would result from the START II activities would "allow the flexibility for further reductions, should the security environment continue to improve."

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Now, assuming that START II is ratified, and assuming that it enters into force, and assuming the additional threat reduction measures which you have outlined in your statement, including transparency, and irreversibility measures that were agreed to at the summit, that they are all carried out.

Is there any reason to believe that the security environment will not improve?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. If you make all those assumptions, the security environment will certainly improve.

Senator LEVIN. Now, at a previous summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin said that further reductions are both a possibility and a goal, further beyond START II.

Assuming that the security environment continues to improve, and that START I and START II enter into force, and are complied with fully, do you know whether the administration continues to hold that as a goal?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We do. And, indeed, it was reaffirmed at the recent summit, that after the START II Treaty is ratified and enters into force, we will begin discussions on future measures in nuclear arms control.

One of the issues in these discussions will certainly be further reductions, not the only issue, but that will be one of the issues.

Senator LEVIN. General, in your prepared statement, you said that even at fewer than 3,500 warheads Russia will have sufficient warheads to cover their U.S. targets and still maintain a reserve, and because of this, additional warheads, generated by cheating, would only have a marginal effect on damage expectancy, or would be used to increase each side's reserve force.

Now, from that, you conclude that there is little incentive for Russia to carry out militarily significant cheating, and even had difficulty constructing a scenario for such cheating.

Are you, in effect, telling us that Russia should be able to—that there is just very little reason, militarily, for Russia to cheat, even if there were any such desire on the part of any of her leaders, that militarily there is no incentive on her part to cheat?

General CLARK. Senator, that is the way it certainly appears to us. When we look at the strategic concept of deterrence, and we look at our own forces, and we look at what the Russian forces would be there, it is very hard for us to imagine what would be gained by this within a balance of those assumptions.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, this is a very important hearing, and I am quite pleased that you called it in a timely manner, so that this committee could have an input.

Before us, Secretary Slocombe has had a long corporate memory of this series of arms control, and I see, also, Ash Carter, who just got up and left the moment I began my questions. [Laughter.]

But anyway, General, we welcome you.

General CLARK. He has a great sense of timing.

Senator WARNER. Well, I was hoping that either you or Secretary Carter could throw a little more light on what are the probabilities in the Duma. I think our records should reflect with some greater detail the attitudes in the Duma.

We hear these reports, more or less, second hand. What can you do to enlighten us? Has Secretary Carter left permanently?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes. He had another commitment, but we have talked about this in detail. He was with the President at the summit. I think there is no question that it will be difficult to get START II ratified in the parliament.

As you say, I have enough corporate memory to remember the time when one would say that about another parliamentary body.

That said, President Yeltsin assured President Clinton that the Russian Government will make every effort to press the Duma for early ratification.

Now, we recognize that this is not a decision which is entirely up to President Yeltsin, and we have been working very actively with groups from the Russian parliament to explain to them both broader issues of U.S.-Russian relations, and particular issues about START II.

And as you would expect, some of the concerns relate to those broader issues, rather than to the details of the treaty.

Now, we have had a series of delegations from the Duma that I believe have met the members of this committee and with you. They were given an opportunity to explain and to talk directly to the people who will be making the decision, not working through the executive branch in Moscow alone.

We believe that the Russian people's elected representatives will come to the conclusion that the START II agreement is in Russia's interest as well as ours, and we will, in due course, ratify the agreement.

Senator WARNER. I think that is probably as complete an answer as you can give on behalf of the President and our executive branch.

But naturally we have concerns here that in the orderly process of our planning, we proceed with reductions and planning which were formulated on the START II being in place at a point in time.

Now, do we have built in some, should we say checkpoints so that we can stop in our planning if for some reason we no longer have the confidence that you expressed this morning in ratification by the Duma?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The first checkpoint is that we will not begin the process, on the United States side, of implementing our START II reductions until that treaty is in effect.

Now, I agree with you that at some point if we were to go out a number of years, and the treaty had not been ratified, we would then have to go look at some program decisions.

Senator WARNER. Well, we have our POM process and all of that is reflective of a——

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is right. We will be watching what the interaction is between the necessary time it would take us to reach the required levels in START II. I suppose there could, in principle, come a time when ratification could be so long delayed that we would not be able to accomplish the reductions in time. That is years away, so it is not an immediate issue.

I believe that if the process goes as we hope and expect it will in Russia, we will not reach that deadline. But I agree, in theory, there is such a deadline.

Senator WARNER. General Clark, would you like to be on the record with a response to this question?

General CLARK. I would stand very clearly behind what Secretary Slocombe has said, Senator.

Senator WARNER. So the Chiefs have taken this into consideration?

General CLARK. Yes. We are watching this very closely, and we do intend to keep our forces aligned.

Senator WARNER. Now, START II, Secretary Slocombe makes reference to the provision of the U.S. financial assistance to help Russia eliminate strategic weapons, as required under the treaty.

What is the current plan for providing such assistance to Russia, and what details can you provide us, and in any way, is that plan impacted by the very serious dilemma that is posed by Chechnya, the continuous fighting in that region, which is of deep concern to the President as well as to Congress?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The only way in which the treaty addresses financial assistance is that if the United States can assist Russia in eliminating strategic arms, the deadline for reaching the START II final limits could be accelerated.

It would be within our rights under the treaty not to provide such assistance, in which case the deadlines would be met on the prescribed date.

Assuming ratification, I think we would want to look long and hard at whether such a position by the United States would make sense, quite apart from other problems, Chechnya, or whatever, that we may have with Russia now or at that point, because relatively small expenditures on the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, by relative to the whole Defense budget, relative even to our strategic nuclear budget, we are able directly to eliminate strategic arms which are aimed at the United States.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Secretary, one more question for General Clark.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Sure.

Senator WARNER. I think you have pretty well answered that.

General Clark, the Nuclear Posture Review recommended that we reduce our Trident submarine force to 14 boats, equipped with a D–5 missile by the year 2003, but under START II we could retain 18 boats, as previously planned.

Moreover, if we wanted to go to 14 boats by 2003, we would not need to make this decision for several more years. It seems as if we have given up significant bargaining leverage and possibly foreclosed important hedging options. What do we gain by announcing at this point our decision to go to 14?

General CLARK. What we have done, Senator, is when we went to the Nuclear Posture Review, we looked at all of the modernization requirements for the forces.

We tried to pick the best balance within the triad, and then picking the modernization that was required to keep each of the systems up to peak operating capability, or take advantage of new technology.

So as we look through the modernizations required of the various systems, we were required to look at what the force structure would be.

So it was necessary, when we went into the fiscal year 1997 program here in the Pentagon, that we get this funding under way. So that is the reason we made the decisions when we did on the force structure.

Senator WARNER. So there were considerations other than for our own modernization program——

General CLARK. That is exactly right.

Senator WARNER. That drove this decision.

General CLARK. That is exactly right.

Senator WARNER. You do not think we gave up any significant leverage, correct?

General CLARK. I do not.

Senator WARNER. All right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I will just delay my round, if you would like to go ahead, and give me a chance to catch up here.

Chairman THURMOND. All right. Mr. Secretary, my main concern is any direct or implicit linkage between START II ratification and our ability to amend or replace ABM Treaty in the future. It will be very difficult for me to support START II if this implies that the ABM Treaty is not open for reconsideration.

In my view, we must find a cooperative path beyond mutually assured destruction and an offense-only form of deterrence. Has the administration ruled out or in any way evaluated such a cooperative transition?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Nothing in the START II Treaty would limit the ability of the two sides, should they decide it was in their interest to do so, to change the terms of the ABM Treaty.

Whether that would be in our interest is a separate question, but there is nothing in the START II Treaty which would prevent it.

Chairman THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, in testimony before this committee earlier this year, Admiral Chiles warned against premature reductions in the U.S. ICBM force.

He suggested that we not take Peacekeeper off operational status, or begin to download Minuteman III until we are confident that Russia will follow through with its commitment to eliminate multiple warhead ICBMs. Does the administration agree with this approach?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We currently agree with it. Yes. We will not begin the reductions necessary to reach the START II levels until the treaty has been ratified, and we will ensure that the pace of our reductions are reasonably related to the pace of Russian reductions.

Chairman THURMOND. General Clark, both START I and START II permit the use of existing ICBMs and SLBMs to launch objects into space. I understand that there have been difficulties with Ukraine, and particularly with Russia, regarding their canning of existing ICBMs and SLBMs used as space-launched vehicles.

Does START I or START II contain provisions applying to the accountability of stages or missiles used as space-launched vehicles?

General CLARK. Yes, it does, Mr. Chairman. We have had those differences. I am happy to report that as a result of understandings reached at the summit, we believe those differences with Russia have been resolved.

Chairman THURMOND. What criteria is used to determine whether a space-launched vehicle is based on an existing ICBM or SLBM?

General CLARK. I want to submit a more complete answer for the record.

Chairman THURMOND. That would be all right if you want to do that.

General CLARK. I think that is the easiest way to do it. We know what the stages consist of, and so when we have seen a system that has those stages in it, we have declared that that is substantially the same as an existing ICBM. That is what sparked the discussion with the Russians.

Chairman THURMOND. You may supplement the record, if you desire.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Could I just add that we have also resolved satisfactorily with Ukraine that is favorably, to our position that the SLVs count if they use the first stage of ICBMs.

We will provide the committee with appropriate advance notification, consistent with the language in last year's Department of Defense authorization conference report on this subject, as we proceed to codify the details of this agreement.

[The information follows:]

A space launch vehicle (SLV) that incorporates the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM is considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type, and is therefore accountable under and subject to the provisions of the treaty. Such an SLV is considered to be a non-deployed missile under the treaty and be subject to all relevant treaty provisions, e.g., transit notifications, numerical limits, geographic constraints, etc.

Chairman THURMOND. General, what impact is there on the ability to monitor non-deployed missiles if there is any difficulty in determining whether a space-launched vehicle is based on existing ICBM or SLBM stages?

General CLARK. I think there would be difficulty, but I think we have that problem resolved now, Senator.

Chairman THURMOND. General Clark, in light of the imposition of lower forces under START II, are there any cheating scenarios either under START I or START II which the Joint Staff would consider as militarily significant?

General CLARK. Senator, we have looked at that quite extensively. I have been unable to construct a militarily significant cheating scenario that has any rationality to it under the assumptions of deterrence and the interest of both sides, in the largest strategic interests of both sides.

Chairman THURMOND. Is there any reason or incentive for the Russians to cheat on START II?

General CLARK. None that we can determine right now, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Secretary Slocombe, in discussions with Russia on future negotiations to further reduce strategic nuclear forces, has there been any discussion about restricting the size of the yield of the warhead on land-based or the sea-leg-based missiles of the triad?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There has not been any discussion of future reductions beyond very general propositions, not in anything like that level of detail.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you. Senator Nunn.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I wish I could have been here for the testimony, I will catch up with that by reading your statements, Secretary Slocombe and General Clark.

On May 5, Washington Post columnist, Jessica Matthews, wrote about the arrangements with Russia—whereby the United States purchases blended down, highly enriched uranium extracted from strategic nuclear weapons—is about to break down. Ms. Matthews termed this as "a huge national security blunder." In my view, if she is right in her facts, it would be a huge national security blunder.

I think this is relevant to today's hearings, because the uranium purchase deal was a major inducement to Ukraine to give up the strategic nuclear warheads on its territory in return for part of the profit from the sale of uranium in those warheads, and, of course, without the Ukrainians doing that, the Russians were not going to basically make much, if any, progress on START II.

It all ties back into the overall goal of arms control, and getting weapons down, and not having nuclear weapons states.

Mr. Secretary, what is the status of the uranium purchase agreement? Is the Defense Department monitoring this? Are you involved in it? Has it been turned over to the private sector, just as if it is another private enterprise deal?

We know we want to save as much money under it as we can and recoup as much as we can from it, but it is a far more important thing than simply a business deal.

Could you tell us whether Ms. Matthews is basically correct in saying that the deal is about to break down?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think she is not correct. I read the story. Obviously, we do not run the U.S. Enrichment Corporation, so the details of the agreement are not under the direct jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.

Senator NUNN. Well, maybe you could tell us a little bit about who does run that, and what——

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is a governmentally-chartered corporation. But let me answer the question more generally. The deal is not about to break down. It has a high national security priority.

It is the subject of interagency oversight. I would like, with your permission, to provide a detailed response to the allegations made in the article for the record.

Senator NUNN. I would be pleased to receive that, subject to the Chairman's okay. I am sure it would be all right if he submits something for the record, will it not?

Chairman THURMOND. That would be satisfactory.

[The information follows:]

Let me state categorically that the administration and the Department of Defense consider the purchase of the HEU to be a high national security priority. It is an essential element in our overall effort to encourage Russia to dismantle excess nuclear warheads and reduce the threat from the proliferation of fissile material. Also, as you noted, the contract served as an incentive for Ukraine to support the Trilateral Statement and remove the nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia for elimination. The HEU contract is a national security transaction for the U.S. Government. However, the realities of budget limitations and our anti-dumping laws do impose certain economic constraints on the structure and implementation of the contract.

The contract calls for HEU from dismantled weapons to be converted to LEU suitable for commercial nuclear reactors and sold to the U.S. executive agent, the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC). This material will then be resold by USEC for use as nuclear reactor fuel. The contract provides for LEU derived from 500 metric tons of HEU from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons to be delivered over 20 years. This material will be resold to commercial customers. This approach has allowed this extraordinarily important nonproliferation initiative, worth approximately $12 billion over 20 years, to be implemented without cost to the American taxpayer.

The negotiations associated with the purchase have been complex, and implementation has been complicated. According to the initial terms of the contract, the HEU was to be transferred to the United States for blend down to LEU. The Russians subsequently decided that they had the capability and would complete the blend down. However, they experienced problems converting HEU to LEU that meets commercial specifications. These problems have recently been overcome, in part with U.S. assistance. Another problem is that although the contract calls for 10 metric tons of LEU to be delivered each year for the first 5 years of the contract, the Russians currently have the capacity to produce only 7 metric tons per year. Accordingly, the United States adjusted its purchase. Furthermore, in order to jump-start Russian production and ensure deliveries of nuclear fuel rods to Ukraine, the United States provided an advance of $60 million last year which will be repaid by initial deliveries.

With regard to the question of equitable payment, the purchase agreement provides for payment to Russia for the enrichment value of this material upon delivery of the LEU. The first shipment of LEU derived from Russian weapons has recently been shipped from St. Petersburg, and will arrive in the United States this month. The price paid for this delivery will be the initially-agreed $82 per unit of enrichment. The contract allows this initial figure to be renegotiated each year. While it is true that USEC has proposed that both sides agree to lower this price to accommodate Russian requests for more favorable terms in other parts of the contract, I would note that this is an issue which is subject to negotiations and that these discussions are still ongoing.

I want to be clear that, while this extraordinary effort has been characterized by an unprecedented degree of cooperation on the part of all parties, there are problems. The contract calls for payment to the Russians for the natural uranium value associated with the LEU when USEC sells or uses it, or at the end of the contract. The Russians want quicker payment than called for in the contract. We know this is an important issue for them and are actively exploring at the policy level ways of meeting the Russian request.

You raised a serious question regarding policy oversight of what we agree is far more a national security issue than an economic contract. We have a major interagency effort underway to ensure the full implementation of this important transaction. The Interagency Working Group on the HEU Contract, chaired by the National Security Staff Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Arms Control, includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff as well as the Departments of State, Energy and Commerce, Office of Management and Budget, and

USEC. The administration is committed to a smooth implementation of this essential contract.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Needless to say, I agree with you that if the deal were to break down on purely commercial grounds, it would be foolish and we will make sure that does not happen.

Senator NUNN. Well, who is in charge? Who really is in charge? Where does Defense play a role with this private governmentally-sponsored group, and where does the National Security Council come in, and where does the President's responsibility come in? Who is responsible here?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, there is interagency oversight, in which the National Security Council, as with most other interagency operations, has the lead.

Senator NUNN. Who has the lead?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The National Security Council.

Senator NUNN. Who on the National Security Council?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am told Dan Poneman, but it may be Bob Bell. I am not sure, but probably it is Dan Poneman. It is the sort of thing he usually handles.

There is an interagency working group on the HEU contract. The Department of Defense participates in it. It has now been confirmed that Dan Poneman, at the NSC, is the Chair.

The bottom line is that we are not going to let this collapse over commercial pricing concerns. We are trying to do it as economically, as reasonably can be done.

Senator NUNN. Sure. I understand that.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Part of the idea is that this deal would be implemented ultimately without cost to the American taxpayers, so pricing issues cannot be entirely ignored, but there is active interagency monitoring.

I am informed that the interagency will be meeting at 1500 this afternoon to look at next steps, which is one of a series of periodic meetings to oversee what is going on.

Senator NUNN. Does the Joint Staff play any role in this? Are you an interagency process, General Clark?

General CLARK. Yes, we are, Senator. We participate in the same group.

Senator NUNN. Do you feel that you are on top of it? Do you think you know what is happening?

General CLARK. As best the interagency can get on top of it. We have our representatives on there. We are fully engaged in it, and we are consulted at every step along the way.

Senator NUNN. Well, I was over there during a lot of the negotiation that went on, and, frankly, it was an unsung miracle that this administration was able to pull that off.

It was one of the more notable accomplishments in diplomacy relating to arms control that I have noted in recent years.

What I am afraid I sense is that it has been delegated over to more of a commercial matter, and that people that are fundamentally in charge of national security issues must continue to play a huge role in it, because if this were to break down, the implications, both in terms of Ukraine, nuclear weapon capacity, will they give that up, the Russian's view of the Ukraine, this is the only—this was kind of the glue that put it together.

It could even cause serious problems between Russia and Ukraine if it broke down. I really think there is a lot at stake here, and I just hope that it is being looked at at high levels.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is. It is, as most of these things, a complicated issue. My understanding is that part of it relates to some anti-dumping problem, that always complicates life.

Senator NUNN. Well, you know Jessica Matthews, and I know Jessica Matthews, and she is a very careful reporter.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. If I may sir, both your concern and the article have reinforced our consciousness that we need to keep a careful policy oversight of this, and that will happen.

Senator NUNN. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I have one other question.

Chairman THURMOND. Fine. Go ahead.

Senator NUNN. Secretary Slocombe, on May 9, Secretary Deutch sent a letter to former Senator Alan Dixon, now chairman of the BRAC Commission, stating, in effect, that the Department of Defense had determined that the closure of the missile wing at Grand Forks would have no impact on future national missile defense options. Secretary Deutch's letter refers to the findings by an interagency group, but does not offer any rationale for the decision.

On its face, the treaty appears to require that an ABM site intended to defend missiles must be located within 150 kilometers of a missile launcher, and only the Grand Forks missile wing appears to be within that range of the existing, now inactivated, ABM site at Grand Forks.

Can you enlighten the committee as to the logic underlying Dr. Deutch's letter, and whether this is, indeed, going to have an adverse impact on the possibility of a national missile defense at some point?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I would like to provide a more complete answer, partly because I, frankly, cannot remember how much of this is classified and how much is not, as to locations, and distances, and so on.

But speaking generally, we are satisfied that there is a relatively straightforward way within the ABM Treaty to make absolutely clear that there is no question that we have the right to deploy at the designated site, if that is what we choose to do.

I would prefer not to go beyond that in public session, but we can give you a detailed answer. And the answer may be unclassified. I simply cannot remember which part of the details are and which are not.

Senator NUNN. Yes. I would like to have that for the record as soon as possible.

[The information follows:]

The administration has considered whether the United States could, consistent with the ABM Treaty, retain an ABM system deployment area at Grand Forks should the ICBM group at Grand Forks be inactivated as DOD has recommended to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The administration has concluded that, consistent with the ABM Treaty's terms and its object and purpose, an ABM system deployment area could be retained on either of two grounds. First, if DOD were to exercise the option included within its recommendation to the Commission to retain a few ICBM silo launchers, the present ABM system deployment area centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area and described in Common Understanding A of the ABM Treaty would continue to contain ICBM silo launchers. Second, even if that option were not adopted and no ICBM silo launchers at Grand Forks itself were to remain, an ABM system deployment

area could nevertheless be retained at Grand Forks because a circle centered in the Grand Forks silo launcher deployment area with a radius of 150 km can be drawn so as to cover both the existing ABM system at Grand Forks and a number of ICBM silo launchers in the Minot field. Since reliance upon this ground presupposes the elimination of all the ICBM silos at Grand Forks, at ABM system deployment area so delineated would be consistent with the purpose of Common Understanding A, which was to assure the Soviets that the U.S. ABM system would not be so located as to protect silos in two different ICBM fields.

Senator NUNN. I guess my bottom line is: If the missile wing at Grand Forks is closed, can we still have a national missile defense site at the present inactivated Grand Forks site?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The answer to that question is yes. And we are satisfied that that is fully consistent with the ABM Treaty by quite straightforward actions.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. The Senator from Nebraska.

Senator EXON. I believe the Senator from Michigan——

Senator LEVIN. I have had a round already; so get your first round in.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much. I apologize for being late. Mr. Chairman and Senator Nunn, thank you for calling this tremendously important meeting.

And I think with all the difficulties that we have today with some of the legitimate concerns that we have as to what is going on inside the Soviet Union today, how we proceed on this matter—and some of us will be with members of the Duma in Spain, is that not next month, Senator Nunn, if I remember correctly?

Senator NUNN. Right.

Senator EXON. And I am sure these matters will come up. The matters of the START treaties have been key parts of several discussions that have taken place between members of the Senate and members of the Duma once or twice in Russia, and at least on one occasion here.

I simply say that with the testimony that we received yesterday in open and closed sessions, with regard to the difficulties and some of the successes that are taking place with regard to the dismantlement of the Russian inventory, we need to keep moving aggressively ahead on this matter of treaty and treaty obligations, in my view, very aggressively, and I congratulate you for doing so.

If I might, let me ask you a question or two about some of the details. I think you can discuss this in an open session.

During numerous discussions that members of this committee have had with the Russian Duma, time and time again the matter came up, "well, why do we not move forward to START III right now, rather than to spend time discussing and ratifying START II?"

That was the position taken by several influential members of the Duma.

Is this push, in your view, that the Russian Government, or members of the Duma might believe that START II perhaps places them in unequal strategic positions—specifically, they are required to eliminate their most capable leg of the triad, the SS–18 land-based heavy ICBMs, while we are able to preserve our most capable and survivable nuclear assets, the Trident submarines and the Trident submarine launch ballistic missiles.

I sometimes wonder if that is not a major concern on their part. I hope that we do not give up on that.

For this reason, I had felt probably that they might want to press ahead with START III, particularly from the standpoint that they obviously do not have the financial resources, in any realistic way, to continue the deployment of the nuclear deterrent that they have available to them today.

I would just like to have you comment on what your views might be as to why they seem to be pressing for START III.

Is that self-serving, or is that more in your opinion of the recognition on their part of the financial resources that are not available to them to carry out even START II? Could you please answer as best you can in open session?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, one of the complications of the fact that Russia now has a democratically elected parliament is that there are members of the parliament, and people in the Russian society who follow these things, who have all kinds of perspectives on these issues, just as from time to time there have been in the United States.

We sometimes get this argument that there are really two—you have outlined two possible concerns. It is certainly true that one of the important provisions of the treaty, that the United States wanted, was it getting rid of the heavy ICBMs. That has been a matter of concern for us for a long time.

There are important things that the Russians wanted in the treaty, which go in their direction. For example, the bombers are counted with their actual weapon load rather than an attributed load; there is also a limit on the number of SLBM warheads, so that we are required under the treaty to distribute our force.

We cannot have a force, even if we wanted it, which we would not, but we could not have a force which is entirely SLBM.

I cannot say there are not people in the Russian parliament who make this argument, but I think the answer is that, as with any other agreement between independent sovereign nation states on important matters, there are provisions which are balanced, or reflect the interest of both sides.

As far as the overall level, I think you are probably right, with the financial pressures that Russia faces, it is hard for them to afford a large strategic force. They seem to be doing it.

We do not have any doubt that they can, if they choose to do it, find the financial resources, within what is still a very substantial military budget, to maintain a force at the START II levels, and maintain a Russian security.

I also think that in many respects the concern in the Duma about ratification of the START II agreement is not particularly a matter of the specifics of the agreement, although I am sure some people have such concerns.

It is of the broader issue of U.S.-Russian relations, a kind of sense of loss of national purpose, national pride, that may be somehow symbolized for them by this agreement.

The United States, as the other party of the agreement, is going to have to talk to people in the Duma.

I want to say that the kinds of contacts that you all have are immensely valuable on this front—of having a way to talk to the Rus-

sian parliamentarians, and not from the perspective of the American Executive Branch.

It will take an effort to get this agreement ratified in Russia. There is no question about that.

I do not know that I have much more to add on what the concerns are. I think those are the broad categories I know about. General Clark.

General CLARK. Well, Senator, those are the concerns that we have heard. I would say there are certainly countervailing arguments that could be deployed against those concerns.

For example, on considering their missiles, they have land-mobile missiles. We do not have anything comparable to the land-mobile missile. That is their strength. We recognize that, and that was, of course, protected under this agreement.

We had said under START I that we would put strict limits on downloading of missiles, and that we relaxed those limits, so that a number of SS–19s could be downloaded from, as I recall, six warheads, down to one, so that they would be acceptable under START II.

So there have been concessions and trades made on both sides. I think that members of the Duma have to keep that in mind when they consider the agreement. We see it as a fair agreement, and one that advances the benefits of crisis stability for both sides.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. You also asked about whether we should go on to START III, and not ratify START II. We think this is a step-by-step process. The way to get to a real START III is to go through the START II step.

If START III is a code word for "let us renegotiate all of these START II provisions," then for obvious reasons, that is something we would not be favorably inclined to do at all and, I think, would slow the process and set it back.

We are already committed, and we will, as soon as the START II agreement is ratified, or if not, well before it is fully implemented, begin discussions with the Russians about follow-on arms control agreements, where a whole variety of issues can come up.

Senator EXON. I thank you for that comment.

We keep telling the Duma representatives we cannot short circuit that. We think it is better to proceed in an orderly fashion, which is basically what the administration and our military endorse, is that correct?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is correct, sir.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, my time is up.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. General, you stated in your testimony that our triad of 3,500 warheads that will remain after the treaty is implemented will support our deterrent and our targeting requirements "against any known adversary, and under the worst assumptions." Is that even without consideration of the inactive reserve?

General CLARK. I am not sure how far I can go in this open session, but we did look carefully. We have reviewed our requirements for deterrence on two occasions, most recently in the Nuclear Posture Review.

We have continued to examine them. We do feel that 3,500 deployed warheads are certainly an adequate number.

Senator LEVIN. And that does not count any of the inactive reserve, is that correct?

General CLARK. We are not counting other non-deployed warheads. Absolutely not.

Senator LEVIN. So you are able to assure this committee that that 3,500 warheads, which does not count any inactive reserve, will support our deterrent and targeting requirements against any known adversary and under the worst assumptions?

General CLARK. That is under the assumption, of course, that both sides are moving forward on START II, and it is ratified and implemented. Yes, Senator.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. If I could, I would like to call attention, just until we can have a public statement on the record, of what General Shalikashvili said in his statement on START II:

> "We concluded that the START II NPR force is sufficient to keep any foreseeable enemy from achieving its war aims against us or our allies, no matter how a nuclear attack against us is designed.
>
> "In practice, this means that our nuclear forces must be robust enough to sustain the ability to support an appropriate targeting strategy and a suitable range of response options, even in the event of a powerful first strike that attempts to disarm our nuclear forces.
>
> "Our analysis shows that, even under the worst conditions, the START II force levels provide enough survivable forces and survivable sustained command and control to accomplish our targeting objectives."

Obviously, a lot more can be said on that subject, but probably that is the most comprehensive and authoritative public statement that I know of on the subject.

Senator LEVIN. And it is your understanding that that figure and that assurance is made even without any counting of the inactive reserve, is that correct?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is the 3,500—well, that——

Senator LEVIN. In other words, the 3,500 does not count the inactive reserve, is that right? We are going to maintain a certain number beyond 3,500——

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is correct.

Senator LEVIN. In inactive status. My question of you and of the Chairman, as well, but I will ask the General, as well, because he is here now is: Are you giving this committee that assurance, that even without counting of the inactive reserve beyond the 3,500, that that 3,500 that is allowed in the START II Treaty will support our deterrent and targeting requirements against any known adversary and under the worst assumptions? That is my question.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is correct.

Senator LEVIN. Now, what is the planned size of the inactive reserve, if you are able to tell us in open session?

General CLARK. I am not sure I can tell you that in open session. We would like to come back in for the record on that.

Senator LEVIN. Without telling us the number, do you know offhand what the number is?

General CLARK. I do not have that number offhand.

Senator LEVIN. Okay. Do you know, Mr. Secretary, without telling us what the number is, do you——

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I understand.

Senator LEVIN. Do you know the number?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am not sure that I am clear on what you mean by the inactive reserve.

Senator LEVIN. Is the so-called hedge that is going to be——

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I understand you to mean warheads which would be stockpiled and available for deployment on launchers, but would not be deployed on launchers.

Senator LEVIN. Exactly. In order to get under the 3,500 limit, we have to take away from the deployed status, warheads, but some of them are going to be retained in an inactive reserve, the so-called hedge.

What I want to know from you, if you know it, what the size of that inactive reserve is. And if you are unable to tell us on the record in public session, do you know it?

General CLARK. We do. We have the number, but it is also classified.

Senator LEVIN. All right. Now, you have it. Are you able to tell us in public session, or is that a classified——

General CLARK. It is a classified number.

Senator LEVIN. All right. So you can give us that in a classified setting, if you would.

General CLARK. Yes.

[The information follows:]

The projected size of the inactive stockpile in 2003 is [deleted] warheads. This assumes START II ratification and includes both strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads. As this figure is a projection, it is subject to refinement as the situation dictates. Further, this figure does not include strategic and non-strategic weapons in the active stockpile, which includes both deployed warheads and required maintenance overhead.

Senator LEVIN. Now, is Russia going to retain an inactive reserve, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. They would certainly have the right to do so under the treaty.

Senator LEVIN. Do you know whether they intend to do so?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I certainly assume that they will.

Senator LEVIN. Why?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think—well, part of the issue is practical; that is, that to dismantle the actual nuclear warhead, as opposed to the launcher and the platform, is a complicated, expensive, and difficult procedure, and the plutonium or the uranium does not cease to exist. It has to be stored.

I assume also that they have the same concern that we do, that if the world changed very dramatically, they might think it advantageous to redeploy some of those warheads.

I have to say that one of the issues that may well be a subject of future discussion, is the disposition of non-deployed, what you call the inactive reserve force.

Senator LEVIN. Have we asked the Russians if they are going to have an inactive reserve?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Let me provide the answer to that question for the record as to whether we have asked and in what context. I am

sure the answer is yes, but let me confirm the circumstances. There is no question that both sides will maintain substantial nondeployed warheads, stockpile, in effect.

[The information follows:]

We have not discussed the specific issue of an inactive reserve with the Russians. While they have indicated that they do have warhead reserves, they have not stated how these reserves function.

Senator LEVIN. Have we asked the Russians how large an inactive reserve they are going to keep?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Again, let me get you the answer for that question.

Senator LEVIN. Is that because you are not sure, or because if you are sure, it is classified material?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am almost sure the answer would be classified, in any event. But when I have not myself conducted the conversations or talked to somebody who has, I am reluctant to answer the question, "Have we asked them something, and what is their answer?" as opposed to what we believe they will do, possibly not from the question and answer mode.

Senator LEVIN. Fine. Then if you could, give us those answers for the record.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Sure.

[The information follows:]

We have not discussed the specific issue of an inactive reserve with the Russians. However, we have initiated discussions with them on nuclear weapon stockpiles in the Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility (STI) working group. We are hopeful that these discussions will result in regular, reciprocal exchanges of information concerning each side's nuclear weapon and fissile material stocks. Since this information would be classified, before an exchange can occur the United States and Russia must conclude an agreement for cooperation, in accordance with a recent change to the Atomic Energy Act. Both sides are currently negotiating such an agreement.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Senator Nunn, do you have any questions?

Senator NUNN. Let me ask a few questions, Secretary Slocombe, regarding the nuclear policy review, particularly the question of hedging strategy.

With respect to hedging, is it true that if we were to retain all 18 Trident submarines and all 95 B–52s, the United States could hedge upward to a larger number of weapons inventory that we can under the proposed NPR force?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. If I understand the question, the answer is tautologically yes, that is, there would be more platforms, that could be uploaded in excess of the levels under——

Senator NUNN. By hedging you mean adding—assume a breakdown in START II——

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Right. Adding additional forces.

Senator NUNN. Right.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The answer is, it seems to me, obviously, yes, there would be more platforms available to load up.

Senator NUNN. If START II is entered into and ratified, and I am sure the administration's position, as you have outlined today, as you hope will be, both here and in Russia, if that occurs, there will

be a third round of START negotiations, in all likelihood, at some point, following that, would there not be?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Senator NUNN. Has any planning been done for that third round?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes. Not in the sense of coming to final conclusions, but we certainly have thought about a variety of issues which we would want to raise, and tried to get some sense of what issues the Russians might want to raise, in a subsequent round.

Senator NUNN. Do you have any feel for whether the Russians are going to be willing to give us credit in another round for the reductions we are making that go beyond our START II obligations?

In other words, are we going to be faced, after making certain unilateral changes that we do not have to make, with that being used as the baseline, rather than being given some credit in the third round for these unilateral NPR reductions?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I would not characterize these as unilateral reductions relative to the START limitations. The various packages that were considered in the NPR, including 18 SSBNs, would all have been consistent with the START II limits.

They would have been achieved in various ways by adjusting the loading of the force, so that both sides will have a significant, not overwhelming, but a significant number of theoretical possibilities to add warheads back on to systems that are retained.

I would not describe adjusting that level as a unilateral reduction. We will maintain, under the NPR force, essentially the same size of overall SLBM forces we would have had with more boats.

Your question relates to will we get credit for the fact that the upload potential is lower.

Senator NUNN. Yes.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, I suppose not. The Russians will also have an upload potential. I want to be clear that this potential is something which we, as well as the Russians, wanted to have built into the START II Treaty, not because of a desire, as such, to upload, but because it is vastly more efficient to be able to use the START II rules for reaching the required warhead levels than if, for example, we had to build whole new submarines to adjust to the warhead levels for SLBMs.

Senator NUNN. Let me ask you another question. If Russia enters into START II and Duma ratifies it, and their economic problems either stay the same or continue to deteriorate, and they simply are not to economically implement their obligations, if all that happens, which is certainly possible, if not probable, what is the administration's strategy to deal with that?

Is the administration prepared—I remember Secretary Cheney came in once, or said publicly once that we ought to consider helping accelerate their dismantling program. Of course, we are doing some of that under Nunn-Lugar now.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We definitely believe it is——

Senator NUNN. Where are we going to be if they just economically cannot do their part of the deal?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The kinds of costs which would be involved are such that I would think that in that wholly hypothetical circumstance, that we would want to look very long and hard at

whether it was not in our interest to continue to fund on the order of pretty much what we have in the Nunn-Lugar program now, fund the dismantlement of Russian strategic nuclear systems, which are, after all, direct and immediate threats to the United States.

Very seldom is it possible by spending American defense money that you can directly reduce this kind of a massive threat to the United States.

I want to emphasize, though, that as of right now, we are under no obligation to provide assistance.

And we would certainly want to make sure—if we got the argument, "Well, we just could not afford it," we would certainly want to understand why that was true, and so on, before we recommended additional funding for assistance.

We have, as I think Senator Exon made the point—maybe it was you—by being able to use the Nunn-Lugar money, the Cooperative Threat Reduction money, we have been able to accelerate reductions.

And it is not just that we get the reductions in Ukraine, and Belarus, and Kazakhstan early, but we have been able to get it done at a time when the political constellation was such that it was feasible to do it.

Some of these things, if they are allowed to fester on, and not get resolved, become harder to resolve. So it is not simply a question of time.

The short answer is I would not want to rule out a recommendation by this or some future administration for additional U.S. assistance if that assistance were critical to getting the Russian reductions made, for exactly the same reason that the money invested right now has been a very good defense investment.

Senator NUNN. There has been considerable criticism of the use of the Nunn-Lugar funding for defense conversion and officer housing. Secretary Perry has spoken on that issue, but what is your view of that? What is the justification?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The justification is that a big part of what we are trying to do with threat reduction is reduce the economic pressures—and this goes to the defense conversion; I will talk about the housing in a minute—to reduce the economic pressures on the Russians to go out and find work with other clients, that is a lot of nuclear capability, a lot of nuclear industry, a lot of nuclear-trained people.

We believe it is very much in our interest to promote the conversion of that defense complex toward other activities.

The amount that we have spent on it obviously is very small, relative to the amount that will be necessary to complete the conversion.

But we see these kinds of pilot projects, these kinds of partnerships between American and Russian, and Ukrainian, and so on, enterprises, as a very good way of building down this potential, specifically with respect to the housing.

Under the rules for the way the Russian military operates, it is often the case that it is not possible to deactivate units, including units in the strategic nuclear forces, without providing housing for the officers who will be retired as a result.

Their system is different from ours in that respect, and, therefore, modest investments in housing, and particularly, to some degree, in the technology of housing, contributes directly to being able to reduce the size of the Russian nuclear threat to the United States.

And in an important sense, this contributes just like helping them with the machines necessary to crush bombers.

So we believe that the relatively modest expenditures, even as a part of total Nunn-Lugar expenditures on these two fronts, are very much in our national interest.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. The Senator from Nebraska.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, I have one last question. Thank you for your very informative and right-on-point answers to the questions.

I would just like to ask one question, if I might, Mr. Chairman, with regard to the warhead dismantlement and destruction proposition.

Yesterday afternoon the Strategic Forces Subcommittee heard testimony from both the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy on the status of our economic energy programs, where we are going, how fast we are going to get there.

We were told that though the START I Treaty has only been in force a relatively short period of time, the United States is about 40 percent on its way toward meeting the dismantlement goals under that treaty.

While this process is going forward, and progress seems to be moving, do you have any concerns that either the United States or Russia might not have the warhead dismantlement, destruction, and nuclear material storage capacity necessary to meet the final deadline of 2003?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I would like to provide a more detailed answer for the record, but the short answer is that I believe that for both the United States and Russia, this will be a significant challenge.

It is something which is well within the capability of each, and we believe it can be done. You are right, though, it is obviously going to take some resources and some specialized capabilities.

And I would like to provide a fuller answer for the record on the basis of our assessment that it can be done, and also what we see as the potential difficulties.

Although both the United States and the Russia Federation will dismantle thousands of nuclear warheads as a result of delivery system reductions under START I and II, those warhead dismantlements are not mandated by START I and II and do not face a deadline of 2003. However, Russia and the U.S. face potential problems in managing the warhead dismantlement and subsequent component storage as the number of warheads necessary to support the active nuclear force is reduced.

The United States has the capacity to store all of the nuclear weapons components (fissile materials) resulting from dismantlement. The process will take a number of years and we will dismantle at the rate of 2000 warheads per year in order to avoid a shortage of storage capacity. Russia has identified storage of fissile material components resulting from dismantlement as the key bottleneck in reaching their warhead dismantlement goals. Supporting Russian dismantlement is a very high priority for the administration, and the United States has been working with Russia under the Nunn-Lugar program to design and construct a safe and secure fissile material storage facility at Mayak which, when complete, will be able to store containers holding fissile material components. In this same context, the United States is also providing containers to store these components. In addition, the Unit-

ed States is providing 115 railcar modification kits which upgrade the safety and security of Russian nuclear weapons railcars in which warheads to be dismantled will be transported. The Department of Defense has a ongoing dialog with the Russian Ministry of Defense to improve the accountability and safety and security of Russia's nuclear weapons. As a result of these discussions, the United States will provide the Russian Ministry of Defense computers to enhance warhead accounting and control and up to 150 "supercontainers" to enhance the safety and security of nuclear warheads being transported to dismantlement.

As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, the United States also is attempting to ease potential bottlenecks in Russian warhead dismantlement by purchasing low-enriched uranium (LEU) derived from 500 metric tons of Russian highly enriched uranium from dismantled nuclear weapons.

More formally, the United States has entered into negotiations to reach agreements to safeguard Russian fissile materials resulting from dismantlement and to make the dismantlement process both transparent and irreversible. The President has boosted this process by ensuring transparency and irreversibility next steps were included in the September 1994 and May 1995 United States-Russian summit statements. Agreements under discussion include exchanging information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear weapons and stocks of fissile material as well as dismantlement schedules. The United States and Russia have almost agreed on a suite of procedures for monitoring stockpiles of plutonium resulting from dismantlement and will soon begin discussion of procedures for monitoring stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. These are very sensitive areas and results will not come quickly. However, the Russians have repeatedly acknowledged that this effort supports our mutual nonproliferation goals, and we are making progress.

Russia has not requested, nor do we assess they require, assistance with the actual dismantlement process. Both they and we have sufficient dismantlement capability to eliminate safely the numbers of warheads that will be removed from service as a result of the START I and II reductions of strategic nuclear delivery systems.

Senator EXON. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions of the panel. I may have some for the record, but I will not take the time to get into that at this juncture.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you very much. I just have two questions. Secretary Slocombe, during negotiations on START II, the United States settled for a political assurance to the effect that only SS–25-type missiles would be deployed in converted SS–18 silo launchers. Why did the United States settle for a political statement, instead of a legal and binding commitment?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That decision was made before I entered the government, and I will have to provide the answer for the record.

For domestic political reasons, the Russians did not want the assurance that they would install only SS–25 type missiles in converted SS–18 silos to be codified as a legal obligation under START II. The United States concluded that having this assurance as a political commitment would be acceptable because the Treaty contains other legally binding requirements designed to preclude missiles significantly larger than the SS–25 from being installed in converted SS–18 silos. For example, each converted SS–18 silo must have a restrictive ring emplaced at the top of the silo, which would preclude re-installing an SS–18 missile, and each such silo must be filled with five meters of concrete. The United States is allowed to confirm that these requirements have been met. Furthermore, START II requires that all SS–18 missiles and launch canisters be destroyed, and it authorizes four additional re-entry vehicle inspections per year specifically for missiles emplaced in converted SS–18 silos. These inspections will allow the United States to confirm that the missile installed in the converted silo has only one re-entry vehicle and that the restrictive ring remains in place.

Chairman THURMOND. From a monitoring verification standpoint, does it make any difference if the Russian commitment is legally binding or politically binding?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No.

Chairman THURMOND. General Clark, has the Joint Staff conducted an analysis——

Mr. SLOCOMBE. In the sense that the verification procedures would allow us to determine whether there had been a departure from a politically binding commitment just as much as from their legally binding commitment. The verification would be the same——

Chairman THURMOND. You dropped your voice. I can hardly hear you.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am sorry. The verification procedures, as I understand it, would be the same in either case.

Chairman THURMOND. General Clark, has the Joint Staff conducted an analysis for strategic stability under START II, relative to the START I force and pre-START II force levels? And what is the impact on strategic stability of dramatically reducing these force levels?

General CLARK. Mr. Chairman, we have done such an examination, and we believe that the impact on strategic stability is entirely positive, because we have gotten rid of the most destabilizing element of the strategic nuclear forces, which is the large MIRV land-based missile.

Chairman THURMOND. I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony and responses to questions about the military implications of START II.

I would ask the clerk to keep the record open for a week to receive questions for the record from members of the committee who were unable to attend the hearing this morning.

This is an extremely important arms control agreement. Once answers are received from the administration, the committee will deliberate on drafting a report to be submitted to the Senate on START II.

Once again, I thank the witnesses here this morning.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, before you close the hearing, could I make one comment?

Chairman THURMOND. Yes, sir.

Senator EXON. I want to emphasize my thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, for this whole area, because you have been involved in it for a long time, even before I came to the United States Senate.

I would simply say that from the information that we had yesterday, with regard to some of the absolutely startling information that came out of that hearing yesterday, with substantiated fears that this Senator has had on several trips to Russia, and a conversation with Russian officials, who many in high authority had assured me that America has had nothing to worry about with regard to the safe storage of highly enriched uranium and other materials, nuclear devices, we get just the opposite from that hearing yesterday, a major concern.

Once again, the people at the subcommittee hearing yesterday emphasized the fact that the Nunn-Lugar proposition has been of immeasurable help, not only to get things done in the Soviet Union, but to smooth relationships therewith.

We simply cannot afford, for our own self-interest and our own national security interests, to dismantle some of the procedures that we are now actively carrying on, especially under Nunn-Lugar.

We cannot afford to dismantle dramatically, as is being attempted in some quarters, in the opinion of this Senator, some of

the monies that we are spending on international aide, trying to influence key parts of the world into our sphere of thinking.

So I think, Mr. Chairman, we must particularly push ahead on this matter of nuclear disarmament. We hope we can approve START II.

It is not perfect, but this is not a perfect world. And this is an extremely dangerous world in which we live. And I think that probably in the end nothing is likely to bring the United States people and the people of Russia closer together than if we can continue to march ahead on provable, verifiable weapons treaties, of which I think START I and, hopefully, START II, and maybe START III, can be an important part of that dialogue in cementing the relationship.

That does not mean that we are all going to get along totally and live happily ever after. But living happily ever after, to a large extent, in this Senator's opinion, is going to depend upon what kind of a world we are going to have with nuclear devices and their spread.

Keep up the good work, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman THURMOND. Thank you.

Again, I want to thank you, Secretary Slocombe and General Clark, for your helpful testimony.

The committee now stands adjourned.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Senator THURMOND. I am concerned about the viability of the U.S. nuclear triad in a post-START II environment. The United States maintains its strategic offensive nuclear forces in a mix of land, air and sea-based strategic nuclear delivery systems known as the "triad." The triad is supposed to be a hedge against technological breakthroughs that could render one or another legs of the triad vulnerable or against a possible system-wide flaw in one leg that could render it ineffective. How does START II and the Nuclear Posture Review preserve the U.S. triad and its viability?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The Nuclear Posture Review reached the conclusion that it was important to retain a triad for essentially the same reasons outlined in your question. The START II agreement fully allows us to do so. The force structure that we will deploy under START II constitutes a stable, flexible triad, which retains the inherent advantages of each of the three parts of the force. Specifically we plan to deploy 14 Trident SSBNs equipped with D–5 missiles. We will have an ICBM force that will consist of 450 to 500 Minuteman IIIs, each carrying a single warhead. We will deploy a heavy bomber force, with 66 B52Hs armed with long range cruise missiles and 20 B–2s in a nuclear role. We will benefit from START II's provisions by reorienting our B–1s to conventional roles. Under the rules established in the START II Treaty, those B–1s will not count against the START II warhead limit, but they could, however, be returned to nuclear roles on a onetime basis, should this become necessary. We have in the budget and the program the necessary resources to maintain this flexible and effective triad. The administration is committed to maintaining a triad, the resources are there to do it, and the START II agreement allows it to be done in an effective and efficient way.

Senator THURMOND. In discussions with Russia on future negotiations to further reduce strategic nuclear forces, has there been any discussion about restricting the size of the yield of the warhead on the land-based or the sea-based missiles of the triad?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No. Discussions about further strategic arms reductions have been very general in nature and have not gotten into details regarding specific restrictions or limitations.

Senator THURMOND. Explain the administration's agenda on issues that should be discussed in a future negotiation to further reduce strategic nuclear forces?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The administration is still conducting its review of arms control policy following START II. However, we consider that our most immediate nuclear arms control tasks are to ensure START I is fully implemented and START II is ratified and implemented.

Senator THURMOND. Over the past year, a number of Russian military and civilian leaders have suggested that they would ratify START II with amendments so that they can keep SS–19s, SS–18s and SS–24s to the end of their service life. START II allows Russia to download 105 SS–19s to single warhead un-MIRVed missiles. Additionally, START II allows Russia to convert SS–18 silo launchers for permitted single-warhead missiles. For the record, I would like assurances that the United States has not indicated in any forum that a possibility exists whereby prior to full implementation of START II, either a policy statement or a future strategic reductions treaty would allow Russia to keep their MIRVed ICBMs until their service life has expired.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The START II Treaty requires that all MIRVed ICBMs be eliminated by January 1, 2003. Once START II enters into force, both sides would be legally obligated to meet this requirement. The U.S. Government has never indicated willingness to change or waive this requirement.

Senator THURMOND. If Russia amended START II in any way that would allow them to keep their MIRVed ICBMs until the end of their service life, what action would the administration take?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Russia cannot unilaterally amend START II; both sides must agree to any amendments to the treaty. Russian Government officials have told us repeatedly that they remain committed to ratification of START II. The Russian Government has made no proposals to amend the treaty.

Senator THURMOND. There have been suggestions from Members of Congress, as well as other foreign countries, that in addition to further reductions by the United States and Russia, that the nuclear arsenals of the United Kingdom, France and China should be reduced. The Chinese Government has made it very clear that they would not consider any reductions to their nuclear arsenal until such time as the U.S. and Russian forces are more in line with theirs. What discussions have taken place with the Russians with regard to further strategic arms reductions?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. At the September 1994 Washington summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the two sides should develop concrete steps to adapt their respective nuclear forces to the changed international security situation, including the possibility, after ratification of START II, of further reductions of and limitations on their remaining nuclear forces. The discussions about further strategic arms reductions have been very general in nature, in part because we consider that our most immediate nuclear arms control tasks are to ensure START is fully implemented and START II is ratified and implemented. The administration is currently conducting its review of arms control policy following START II.

Senator THURMOND. START II relaxes some of START I's counting rules for ICBM and SLBM warheads. Specifically, START II counts the actual number of warheads on a missile, rather than what it is capable of carrying. This relaxation of the counting rules only applies to START II, so as a result one missile could count as having 6 or 10 warheads under START I, and only count as 1 warhead under START II. The United States has had a terrible time with its accounting abilities, according to recent articles about the Department of Defense financial system. Is there a risk that double counting systems for START I and START II could result in the United States inability to determine compliance with one or the other treaty?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Both the United States and Russia recognize that a missile may be attributed with a certain number of warheads under START II while simultaneously being attributed with a higher number of warheads under START I. This situation will not adversely affect our ability to assess compliance with either treaty, and we expect that keeping track of the different warhead attributions will be a simple, straightforward exercise. It is also important to note that, with the exception of up to 105 SS–19 ICBMs in Russia, the number of warheads on an ICBM or SLBM may not be reduced by more than four warheads under START II. (The number of warheads on 105 SS–19s may be reduced by five warheads each.)

Senator THURMOND. START II requires Russia to destroy all its SS–18 heavy ICBMs as well as destroy or convert their silos. I understand that Kazakhstan has just announced the removal of all missiles from their territory, however, there are still a third of Russia's silos in Kazakhstan. I seem to recall that there was a disagreement between Russia and Kazakhstan regarding the silos. Has an agreement been reached between Russia and Kazakhstan regarding the silos?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. In accordance with their commitments under START I, Russia and Kazakhstan have agreed on their respective responsibilities for eliminating SS–18 silos, and such eliminations have begun. All SS–18 silos in Kazakhstan are

scheduled to be eliminated by the end of 1997. Furthermore, Kazakhstani and Russian officials recently announced that all strategic nuclear warheads have been removed from Kazakhstan and returned to Russia. In addition, SS–18 missiles located in Kazakhstan are also being returned to Russia for elimination.

Senator THURMOND. Both START I and START II permit the use of existing ICBMs and SLBMs to launch objects into space. I understand that there have been difficulties with Ukraine, and in particular with Russia regarding the accounting of existing ICBMs and SLBMs used as space launch vehicles. Does START I or START II contain provisions applying to the accountability of stages or missiles used as space launch vehicles?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The START I Treaty contains a number of provisions that deal explicitly with the use of ICBMs and SLBMs for launching objects into the upper atmosphere or space. (The provisions of the START I Treaty pertaining to use of ICBMs and SLBMs for space launch apply for START II Treaty purposes as well.) It is clear from these provisions, including constraints on the number of missiles that may be located at treaty declared space launch facilities, that these missiles remain accountable as ICBMs and SLBMs under the treaty. More importantly, the treaty contains provisions which explicitly identify when treaty-limited items (such as ICBMs and SLBMs) first become accountable under the treaty, and when they cease to be accountable (i.e., through launch or elimination). There are no provisions in the treaty for removal of ICBMs or SLBMs from accountability through converting them for use as space launch vehicles.

Senator THURMOND. What criteria are used to determine whether a space launch vehicle is based on an existing ICBM or SLBM?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. If a space launch vehicle incorporates the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM subject to the treaty, it is considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type, and is therefore accountable under and subject to the provisions of the treaty.

Senator THURMOND. What impact is there on the ability to monitor non-deployed missiles if there is any difficulty in determining whether a space launch vehicle is based on an existing ICBM or SLBM stage?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. As previously noted, a space launch vehicle is accountable under the treaty as an ICBM or SLBM if it incorporates the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM. Such space launch vehicles would therefore be considered to be non-deployed missiles under the treaty and would be subject to all relevant treaty provisions, e.g., transit notifications, numerical limits, geographic constraints, etc. This is precisely why the United States has insisted to our treaty partners that space launch vehicles using ICBM or IBM first stages must remain accountable under the treaty. If that were not the case, the effectiveness of a number of treaty provisions would come into question.

Senator THURMOND. During negotiations on START II, the United States settled for a political assurance to the effect that only SS–25 type missiles would be deployed in converted SS–18 silo launchers. Why did the United States settle for a political statement instead of a legally binding commitment?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. For domestic political reasons, the Russians did not want the assurance that they would install only SS–25 type missiles in converted SS–18 silos to be codified as a legal obligation under START II. The United States concluded that having this assurance as a political commitment would be acceptable because the treaty contains other legally binding requirements designed to preclude missiles significantly larger than the SS–25 from being installed in converted SS–18 silos. For example, each converted SS–18 silo must have a restrictive ring emplaced at the top of the silo, which would preclude re-installing an SS–18 missile, and each such silo must be filled with five meters of concrete. The United States is allowed to confirm that these requirements have been met. Furthermore, START II requires that all SS–18 missiles and launch canisters be destroyed, and it authorizes four additional re-entry vehicle inspections per year specifically for missiles emplaced in converted SS–18 silos. These inspections will allow the United States to confirm that the missile installed in the converted silo has only one re-entry vehicle and that the restrictive ring remains in place.

Senator THURMOND. From a monitoring and verification standpoint, does it make any difference whether the Russian commitment is legally-binding or politically binding?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No. The monitoring methods are independent of the type of commitment. The United States assesses compliance with both legally and politically binding obligations, and these assessments are provided to Congress in the annual Noncompliance Report.

Senator THURMOND. I understand that the administration has concluded that the ICBM Wing at Grand Forks Air Force Base can be deactivated and we can still retain the option of deploying an ABM Treaty compliant national missile defense sys-

tem at Grand Forks. Given that the ABM Treaty requires such an NMD deployment to be within 150 kilometers of an ICBM field, how did you arrive at this finding?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The administration has considered whether the United States could, consistent with the ABM Treaty, retain an ABM system deployment area at Grand Forks should the ICBM group at Grand Forks be inactivated as DOD has recommended to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. The administration has concluded that, consistent with the ABM Treaty's terms and its object and purpose, an ABM system deployment area could be retained on either of two grounds. First, if DOD were to exercise the option included within its recommendation to the Commission to retain a few ICBM silo launchers, the present ABM system deployment area centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area and described in Common Understanding A of the ABM Treaty would continue to contain ICBM silo launchers. Second, even if that option were not adopted and no ICBM silo launchers at Grand Forks itself were to remain, an ABM system deployment area could nevertheless be retained at Grand Forks because a circle centered in the Grand Forks silo launcher deployment area with a radius of 150 km can be drawn so as to cover both the existing ABM system at Grand Forks and a number of ICBM silo launchers in the Minot field. Since reliance upon this ground presupposes the elimination of all the ICBM silos at Grand Forks, an ABM system deployment area so delineated would be consistent with the purpose of Common Understanding A, which was to assure the Soviets that the U.S. ABM system would not be so located as to protect silos in two different ICBM fields.

Senator THURMOND. To date the Congress has not received a detailed plan on implementation of the Nuclear Posture Review. When will this implementation plan be available?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Those aspects of the NPR related to force structure have been and will continue to be reflected in budget submissions to the Congress. A classified Secretary of Defense directive implementing the President's NPR decisions will be issued to DOD components.

NPT EXTENSION AND ARMS REDUCTIONS

Senator THURMOND. During the recently completed negotiations permanently extending the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the world's non-nuclear nations made it clear to the United States and Russia that permanent extension of the treaty was based on the understanding that we would continue to reduce our nuclear arsenals.

Would not ratifying START II be a significant breach of this understanding with the world community committed to nuclear nonproliferation?

General CLARK. The significant reduction of our nuclear arsenal that has accompanied the end of the Cold War, the negotiation and ratification of START I, and the signing of START II formed the backdrop of the NPT extension conference and have demonstrated that the United States is serious about reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons. This was certainly one of the factors that shaped the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely, and without conditions. Failure to ratify START II would certainly raise other nations' doubts about our commitment to continued nuclear reductions.

ORIGINAL NEGOTIATING GOALS

Senator THURMOND. The original 1982 strategic arms reduction goals, as stated by General Powell in 1991, were to enhance deterrence and achieve stability through significant reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear systems, ballistic missiles, in particular ICBMs with multiple warheads; to maintain an overall level of strategic nuclear capability that would be seen as sufficient to deter conflict; to underwrite U.S. national security; and to meet U.S. commitments to allies and friends.

Is it your judgment that the U.S.' strategic nuclear forces will be militarily sufficient and capable of meeting these goals in the post-START II world?

General CLARK. In every measure, the 3,500 warhead force which we will retain under START II, consistent with the Nuclear Posture Review, is militarily sufficient, both in size and capability, to meet both our deterrent and the 1982 strategic arms reduction goals.

TRIDENT FORCE UNDER START II

Senator THURMOND. The Nuclear Posture Review recommended that we reduce our Trident submarine force to 14 subs equipped with the D–5 missiles by the year 2003. Under START II, however, we could retain 18 subs. Moreover, even if we wanted to go to 14 subs by 2003, we would not need to make this decision for sev-

eral more years. Why have we given up this significant bargaining leverage and possibly foreclosed important hedging options?

What have we gained by announcing at this point our decision to go down to 14 subs?

General CLARK. With the end of the Cold War and the negotiation of the START I and START II treaties, the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy is changed. Our security policy relies less on these nuclear forces and they will be fewer in number. Nonetheless, our nuclear forces must both always be sufficient to guarantee our core military security regardless of the emergence of any unexpected world changes and also to provide a clear signal to other nuclear powers that the United States remains committed to reductions in nuclear forces. This is the essence of Secretary Perry's strategy of "Lead and Hedge"—carefully considered reductions in nuclear forces balanced against maintaining a robust capability with the ability to upload forces if ever required.

The NPR force of 14 Trident submarines equipped with the D–5 is not significantly different from an 18 ship force in terms of military sufficiency. The 14 ship force has a significant upload capability, and submarine operational limitations due to missile range are not significantly different for the 14 and 18 ship cases. Retaining only 14 ships will save the Nation $6.8 billion over the next 18 years.

A force of 14 Tridents thus best fulfills our strategy of "Lead and Hedge."

Senator THURMOND. What leverage is the United States left with in future negotiations on further reductions in strategic arms?

General CLARK. In our view, we have neither given up significant bargaining leverage or foreclosed any hedging options. The START II Treaty limitations are on deployed warheads—in this case, 1,750 SLBM warheads—not numbers of Trident submarines. Whether we put these warheads on 14 or 18 submarines should be primarily based on warfighting and fiscal considerations. Currently, our SSBN force will peak at 18 and then decrease to 14 as we bring down our four oldest hulls. This decision will result in significant cost reductions over the long run with minimal impact on warfighting capability. If the United States should choose to do so, nothing would preclude us from maintaining a force of 18 submarines, therefore, we have not given up any leverage in future arms control negotiations.

Senator THURMOND. Does the fiscal year 1996 and future year budget include sufficient funds to ensure SSBN force structure and D–5 SLBM procurement for 18 Trident subs?

General CLARK. The current Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) does not include sufficient funds to support either an SSBN force structure of 18 Trident submarines equipped with the D–5 missile or sufficient D–5 missile procurement to be able to outfit a force of this size with the D–5 missile.

The funding for a force of 18 D–5 Trident SSBNs would be greater than the currently budgeted funding stream. The reason for this difference is that a force of 18 D–5 Trident submarines will require additional operations and maintenance costs associated with the increased number of backfits and refueling overhauls, additional manpower costs associated with crewing the four added SSBNs, weapons procurement money to procure an additional 85 D–5 missiles as well as shipboard hardware (launcher and fire control systems) for 4 more SSBNs.

An informative comparison can be made between costing data for a rough order of magnitude estimate of the 18 D–5 Trident force adapted from data provided to the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to the currently budgeted FYDP force of 14 D–5 Tridents. The NPR data was adjusted to make the 18 SSBN program more comparable with the current 14 D–5 SSBN program.

18 D–5 Trident Entering Assumptions

Commence D–5 backfits (concurrent with refueling overhaul) in fiscal year 2000 and have one per year enter the 2 year backfit process until fiscal year 2007.

D–5 Missile final inventory objective is 519 versus 434 for 14 SSBN case.

18 D–5 Trident Cost Comparisons

The total FYDP cost of 18 D–5 Trident program is estimated at $16.7 billion versus $15.2 billion currently budgeted. This represents a difference of $1.5 billion over the FYDP. In the out years, from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2013, the 18 SSBN force will cost a projected $5.3 billion more than the current 14 SSBN plan. Although the short-term FYDP differences may be lessened by pushing the backfits and missile procurements further into the out years, the total cost difference estimated here at $6.8 billion will have to be paid to acquire this larger force structure.

DENUCLEARIZATION OF UKRAINE

Senator THURMOND. Last week, Kazakhstan announced that all SS–18 missiles had been removed from its territory and moved to Russia. I understand that Ukraine will complete the removal of its missiles sometime next year, barring some unforeseen situation arising between Ukraine and Russia.

Has Kazakhstan in fact removed all its SS–18s to Russia, and what are the national security implications for the United States if any of the republics fail to meet their START I commitments?

General CLARK. While Kazakhstan has removed all nuclear warheads from its territory, some SS–18 airframes still remain. The Kazakhstanis continue to return SS–18 airframes to Russia.

The answer to the second part of the question depends on the situation. Obviously, we would view any failure of the nuclear republics to meet their START I commitments very seriously. The national security implications would depend on the situation. However, we view this as extremely unlikely given the rapid progress of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the areas of warhead removal and START-mandated eliminations.

MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF CHEATING SCENARIOS

Senator THURMOND. In the light of the imposition of lower forces under START II, are there any cheating scenarios, either under START I or START II which the Joint Staff would consider as militarily significant?

Is there any reason or incentive for the Russians to cheat on START II?

General CLARK. A militarily significant violation would occur when one side achieves a significant increase in capability that would require the other side to change its force structure in reaction. Both during and after the treaty negotiations, we have examined multiple ways that the Russians could conceivably violate the treaty to augment their forces. It is difficult to come up with a militarily relevant cheating scenario.

Under START II, the Russians will have sufficient strategic nuclear warheads to accomplish all of their warfighting objectives, including maintaining an adequate reserve, without resort to cheating. Additional warheads generated by cheating would only serve to increase their reserve force. Because these additional warheads would have little effect on a Russian attack and would be very embarrassing if detected, we can find little incentive to carry out a militarily significant violation.

STRATEGIC STABILITY UNDER START II

Senator THURMOND. Has the Joint Staff conducted an analysis of strategic stability under START II, relative to the START I force and pre-START force levels?

What is the impact on strategic stability of dramatically reducing these forces?

General CLARK. The Joint Staff has analyzed strategic stability under START II. Under START II, the most dramatic reduction is the elimination of the most destabilizing weapons; land-based MIRVed ICBMs. Along with eliminating land-based MIRVs in general, START II achieves the long-standing U.S. goal of eliminating the last of the heavy ICBMs, the SS–18. By shifting the focus of our strategic forces away from these destabilizing systems and toward more stabilizing systems such as SLBMs and single-warhead ICBMs, START II will allow both sides to maintain militarily sufficient forces which greatly improve crisis stability.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR J. JAMES EXON

Senator EXON. Do you have any concerns about either the United States or Russia might not have the warhead dismantlement, destruction, and nuclear material storage capacity necessary to meet the final deadline of 2003?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Although both the United States and the Russian Federation will dismantle thousands of nuclear warheads as a result of delivery system reductions under START I and II, those warhead dismantlements are not mandated by START I and II and do not face a deadline of 2003. However, Russia and the United States face potential problems in managing the warhead dismantlement and subsequent component storage as the number of warheads necessary to support the active nuclear force is reduced.

The United States has the capacity to store all of the nuclear weapons components (fissile materials) resulting from dismantlement. The process will take a number of years and we will dismantle at the rate of 2,000 warheads per year in order to avoid a shortage of storage capacity. Russia has identified storage of fissile material components resulting from dismantlement as the key bottleneck in reaching

their warhead dismantlement goals. Supporting Russian dismantlement is a very high priority for the administration, and the United States has been working with Russia under the Nunn-Lugar program to design and construct a safe and secure fissile material storage facility at Mayak which, when complete, will be able to store containers holding fissile material components. In this same context, the United States is also providing containers to store these components. In addition, the United States is providing 115 railcar modification kits which upgrade the safety and security of Russian nuclear weapons railcars in which warheads to be dismantled will be transported. The Department of Defense has an ongoing dialogue with the Russian Ministry of Defense to improve the accountability and safety and security of Russia's nuclear weapons. As a result of these discussions, the United States will provide the Russian Ministry of Defense computers to enhance warhead accounting and control and up to 150 "supercontainers" to enhance the safety and security of nuclear warheads being transported to dismantlement.

As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, the United States also is attempting to ease potential bottlenecks in Russian warhead dismantlement by purchasing low-enriched uranium (LEU) derived from 500 metric tons of Russian highly enriched uranium from dismantled nuclear weapons.

More formally, the United States has entered into negotiations to reach agreements to safeguard Russian fissile materials resulting from dismantlement and to make the dismantlement process both transparent and irreversible. The President has boosted this process by ensuring transparency and irreversibility next steps were included in the September 1994 and May 1995 U.S.-Russian summit statements. Agreements under discussion include exchanging information on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear weapons and stocks of fissile material as well as dismantlement schedules. The United States and Russia have almost agreed on a suite of procedures for monitoring stockpiles of plutonium resulting from dismantlement and will soon begin discussion of procedures for monitoring stockpiles of highly enriched uranium. These are very sensitive areas and results will not come quickly. However, the Russians have repeatedly acknowledged that this effort supports our mutual nonproliferation goals, and we are making progress.

Russia has not requested, nor do we assess they require, assistance with the actual dismantlement process. Both they and we have sufficient dismantlement capability to eliminate safely the numbers of warheads that will be removed from service as a result of the START I and II reductions of strategic nuclear delivery systems.

[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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